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MATTHEW C. URIE*

Share and Share Alike? Natural
Resources and Hazardous Waste
Under the Commerce Clause
ABSTRACT
This article is a practicalanalytical guide to the historical influence
of the Commerce Clause on various attempts by States to tax,
prohibitor otherwise regulate the interstatetransportationof natural
resources and hazardouswaste. The article reviews and analyzes the
seminal Commerce Clause cases decided by the United States
Supreme Court relating to the transportation of certain natural
resources across state lines, involving attempts by States to either
preserve naturalresourcesfor the use, benefit, or financialadvantage
of their citizens or to impede the use of such resourcesfor what may
be viewed as an undesirable purpose.
As peace was restored to the Thirteen Colonies after their
revolution and separation from Great Britain, they began the difficult task
of rebuilding relations among themselves and the countries of the world.
This task became endlessly complex when solutions to national problems
could not be agreed upon by the States who had the exclusive power of
regulating their commerce with other States and with foreign countries.
Each state would advocate solutions to national problems, which, not
coincidentally, benefited and enhanced its commercial interest usually at
the expense of another state's interests. As a result, "Measures of a
commercial nature, which were adopted in one state from a sense of its
own interests, would be often countervailed or rejected by other states
from similar motives."' Each state had interests, due to the nature of its
exploitable resources, and geographical location, not shared or shared
only in part by other states.2
* The author is an attorney with the United States Department of Energy and holds a JD
degree from Brigham Young University and a Master of Laws degree in environmental law
from the George Washington University. The opinions expressed in this article are those of
the author alone, and do not represent the views or opinions of the United States
Department of Energy.
1. JOSEPH STORY, CoMMENTARus ON THE CoNsTrurON OF THE UNITED STATES 239 (1833).
2.
If one should levy duties to maintain its own government and resources,
there were many temptations for its neighbors to adopt the system of free
trade, to draw to itself a larger share of foreign and domestic commerce.
The agricultural states might easily suppose that they had not an equal
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The chaos, allowed by the Articles of Confederation, 3 led to
serious dissension among the States.4 Differing commercial regulations
among the states were a source of irritation and jealousy.' The perceived
grievances, real or imaginary, of each state were multiplied; state
animosities arose and local prejudices were fostered to a high degree that
threatened the peace and safety of the Union.6 However, a national
solution to these problems was not easy. It was undeniable that under the
Articles of Confederation, Congress possessed no effectual power to
guaranty the faithful observance of any commercial regulation, particularly in cases of reciprocal obligations with foreign countries.7 Congress,
"Ibleing invested by the articles of confederation with a limited power to
form commercial treaties . . . endeavored to enter into treaties with
foreign powers upon principles of reciprocity. But these negotiations
were, as might be anticipated, unsuccessful, for the parties met upon very
unequal terms."8
interest in a restrictive system with the navigating states. And, at all
events, each state would legislate according to its estimate of its own
interest, the importance of its own products, and the local advantages or
disadvantages of its position in a political or commercial view. To do
otherwise would be to sacrifice its immediate interests, without any
adequate or enduring consideration; to legislate for others, and not for
itself; to dispense blessings abroad, without regarding the security of those
at home. Id. at 240.
3. See Article IV of the Articles of Confederation which states, in part:
The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse
among the people of the different states in the Union, the free inhabitants
of each of these states, paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives from justice
excepted, shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of free
citizens in the several states; and the people of each State shall have free
ingress and regress to and from any other State, and shall enjoy therein all
the privileges of trade and commerce, subject to the same duties, impositions, and restrictions, as the inhabitants thereof respectively; provided,
that such restrictions shall not extend so far as to prevent the removal of
property imported into any State, to any other State of which the owner in
an inhabitant; provided also, that no imposition, of duties or restriction,
shall be laid by any State on the property of the United States, or either of
them ....
The Articles of Confederation were adopted by delegates of the original Thirteen Colonies,
subject to ratification, on Saturday, November 15, 1777. The Articles were eventually ratified
by New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, Pennsylvania,
Virginia and South Carolina on July 9,1778; by North Carolina on July 21,1778; by Georgia
on July 24,1778; by New Jersey on November 26, 1778; by Delaware on February 22, 1779;
and by Maryland on March 1, 1781. THOMAS DONALDSON, THE Puouc DOMAIN 57 (1884).
4. See STORY, supra note 1, at 240.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 242. See also THE FEDERALIST No. 42 (James Madison).
8. See STORY, supra note 1, at 242.
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The inability of Congress to lay taxes and collect revenue, and to
regulate foreign commerce or commerce between the States was deemed
the leading defect in the confederation.9 This state of affairs led
to the
10
drafting and adoption of the Constitution of the United States.
9. Id. at 239.
10. In addition to the problems of commerce, boundary conflicts among the members of
the Confederation also constituted a significant problem.
Even before the Thirteen Colonies had formally expressed the intention to seek
independence from Great Britain, serious boundary conflicts existed between the Colonies
resulting from the inaccurate language used in the numerous grants of vast parcels of
"Western" land by the Mother Country to the Colonies, the London and Plymouth
Companies. See PAUL W. GATES, HisroRY oF PuBuc LAND LAw DEVELOPMENT 49 (1968). The
confusion created by the inaccurate language, compounded by the lack of geographical
knowledge of the Western land threatened at times to cause warfare between the Colonies.
Id. Best known of these conflicts concerned the boundaries separating (1) Maryland from
Pennsylvania, (2) Maryland from Virginia, (3) Massachusetts from New Hampshire and
New York, (4) New Hampshire from New York, (5) New York from Connecticut, and (6)
Connecticut from Pennsylvania. Additional confusion was created by colonies whose land
claims resulted from the conquest of British armies by a particular colony's troops. Id. For
example, while George Rogers Clark's defeat of the British at Vincennes and Kaskaskia validated America's claim to the territory between the Ohio River and the Great Lakes, it also
strengthened Virginia's claim to the territory which had been won by her troops. Id.
The claims to vast tracts of Western land, primarily by the states of New York,
Virginia, and Georgia, gave rise to the fears of the smaller states, notably Maryland and
New Jersey, that upon settlement of those Western lands, the claimant states would grow
in political influence and eventually dominate the affairs of the new nation. Id. at 50.
Maryland argued that the Western lands should be held as common property to provide
funds in support of the Revolutionary War and for the general welfare of all the states. Id.
Additionally, the Continental Congress needed lands to full the promises of land bounties
to its soldiers and to the mercenaries of the British Army who deserted. Id.
The controversy so threatened the future of the Confederation that on September
6, 1780, Congress adopted a resolution recognizing that:
It appears more advisably to press upon those States which can remove the
embarrassments respecting the western country, a liberal surrender of a
portion of their territorial claims, since they cannot be preserved entire
without endangering the stability of the general confederacy; to remind
them how indispensably necessary it is to establish the Federal Union on
a fixed and permanent basis, and on principles acceptable to all its
respective members ....
See DONALDSON, supra note 3, at 64. This resolution recommended that those States having
claims to Western land pass such laws as were necessary to remove this obstacle to final
ratification of the Articles of Confederation. Id.
On Tuesday, October 10, 1780, Congress further resolved that:.
ITihe unappropriated lands that may be ceded or relinquished to the
United States, by any particular State, pursuant to the recommendation of
Congress of the 6th day of September last, shall be disposed of for the
common benefit of the United States, and be settled and formed into
distinct republican states, which shall become members of the Federal
Union, and have the same rights of sovereignty, freedom and independence as the other States ....
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To remedy the commercial chaos that existed in the confederation, the Constitution included a Commerce Clause that provides: "The
Congress shall have Power ... To regulate Commerce... among the
several States ... ."" This clause constitutes not only a grant of power
to Congress to regulate foreign and domestic commerce, but also a
limitation on the power of States to burden commerce through the
imposition of taxes, duties, prohibitions, or other means.
As the Commerce Clause gave exclusive control over interstate
commerce to the Congress, solidifying the interests and resources of the
States for the benefit of all, its influence continues in issues of interest to
this and future generations of environmentally-conscious Americans. The
past three decades have seen a renewed interest in the breadth of the
Commerce Clause in light of public concerns in the areas of pollution,
disposition of hazardous wastes, air and water quality, America's
dependence upon foreign energy resources and the utilization of the
Nation's public domain lands. This interest and these concerns have been
fueled by the diminishing aesthetics and natural resources in some states
and the newly discovered wealth of vital natural resources in other
states. 2 Commerce Clause challenges have resulted when these resource-rich states have attempted to secure the economic advantages of
exploiting their natural resources, while at the same time trying to avoid

Id. Following these resolutions and recommendations, seven states eventually made cessions
of territory to the Federal Union: New York on March 1, 1781; Virginia on March 1, 1784;
Virginia on December 30,1788; Massachusetts on April 19,1785; Connecticut on September
13, 1786; South Carolina on August 9, 1787; North Carolina on February 25, 1790; and
Georgia on April 24,1802. Id. These cessions created a federal public domain amounting to
approximately 237 million acres. This federal public domain, which included subsequent
land purchases, is the basis of the federal government's present-day control over vast
amounts of land primarily within the Western States and its attendant control over much
of the Nation's natural resources. See GATEs, supra, at 55 (Gates notes that this figure of 237
'million acres does not include subsequent deductions of 3.8 million acres in the Connecticut
Western Reserve and the Fireland tract which Connecticut retained and approximately 4.2
million acres reserved by Virginia to satisfy bounty warrants. Gates also notes other
subsequent adjustments to this figure).
11. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8.
12. Note, The Commerce Clause and Federalism: Implications for State Control of Natural
Resources, 50 GBO. WASH. L. REV. 601, 620 (1982). Six states-Montana, Wyoming, Illinois,
West Virginia, Kentucky, and Pennsylvania--contain 76% of the country's coal. U.S. Dep't
of Energy, Demonstrated Reserve Base of Coal in the United States on January 1, 1979
(1981). Montana and Wyoming alone contain 40%. Id. Louisiana and Texas hold approximately 51% of the nation's proved gas reserves. See U.S. Dep't of Energy, U.S. Crude Oil,
Natural Gas and Natural Gas Liquids Reserves, 1979 ANN. REP.18 tbl. 9 (1981). Those two
states plus Alaska account for approximately 67% of proved natural gas reserves. See id.
Approximately 87%of total estimated proved crude oil reserves lie beneath Alaska, Texas,
Louisiana, and California. See id. at 14, tbl. 6.
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the disadvantages of such exploitation, including polluted water, dirty
air, foul-smelling waste dumps and defiled landscapes.
The policies and regulation of natural resource development in
these resource-rich states are further complicated by the fact that many
of the exploitable and valuable resources exist on land owned by the
federal government. Often, the interplay between state and federal laws
regarding natural resource development and environmental concerns
raises questions of the supremacy of federal laws' and the extent of
States' rights under the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution 4 to
exercise their historic police powers to protect the health and welfare of
their citizens.
But conflicts between the States and federal government are not
the only nemeses of natural resource development and the efforts to
meaningfully address environmental concerns. In attempting to secure the
advantages of the natural abundance within their borders for their
citizens, states may violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment'5 or the Privileges and Immunities Clause. 6
Irrespective of the myriad conflicts that can arise in the development of natural resources and efforts to address environmental concerns,
few would argue with the premise that those burdened by the development should be compensated in some way for that burden. After all, in
large part it is the state and local government which must assure
adequate police protection, building inspection, clean water, clean air,
adequate sewage capacity and schools for workers and their dependents
who seek the jobs provided by oil, gas, coal and hardrock mineral
development, the construction of electricity-generating facilities, and the
exploitation of forests for their valuable timber. State and local governments must have the financial resources to deal with the environmental
hazards associated with resource development and assure that their water
and air resources remain clean, their landscapes are reclaimed and that
their wildlife exists with minimal or at least acceptable impact. These
ideals raise significant issues for which few answers, satisfactory to all,

13. The Supremacy Clause contained in Artide VI, Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution
states, Mhe Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance [of the Constitution].. shall be the supreme Law of the Land .... "

14. The Tenth Amendment states in part: "The powers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively,

or to the people."
15. The Equal Protection Clause, contained in section Iof the Fourteenth Amendment to
the Constitution states, in part: "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall...
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
16. The Privileges and Immunities Clause, contained in article IV, section 2, clause Iof
the Constitution states: "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and
Immunities of Citizens in the several States."
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have been found. The search for these answers must continue with haste
as the need to develop these resources escalates and the resulting
environmental impacts are better understood.
This article reviews the seminal Commerce Clause cases decided
by the United States Supreme Court relating to the development of
natural resources and impacts on the environment. As observed, this
article is divided into sections according to the type of resource involved.
Upon conclusion of the case-review sections, Section VIII reviews the
principles of law applicable to categories of cases found within each
section and provides guidance for the analysis of future cases.
I. The Natural Gas Resource
Several of the earliest Commerce Clause cases reviewed by the
United States Supreme Court involved the natural gas resource. In West
v. Kansas Natural Gas Company, 7 the State of Oklahoma enacted a
statute which provided that no Oklahoma corporation engaged in the
transmission of natural gas, would be granted a charter, given the power
of eminent domain, or have the right to use the highways of the State,
unless it was expressly stipulated in the corporate charter that it would
transport natural gas only to points within the State." This total
prohibition on the transportation of natural gas out of the State was the
result of an effort by the legislature to preserve the State's natural gas
fields from destructive waste.19 This interest in preservation was
motivated by an increasing population and the fact that the legislature
viewed natural gas as the only "practical, usable fuel, both for domestic
and industrial use ... ."I' To the allegation that the Oklahoma statute

17. 221 US. 229 (1911).
18. The pertinent portions of the law provided:
Section 2. No corporation organized for the purpose of, or engaged in, the
transportation or transmission of natural gas within this State, shall be
granted a charter or the right of eminent domain, or right to use the
highways of this State, unless it shall be expressly stipulated in such
charter that it shall only transport or transmit natural gas through its
pipelines to points within this State; that it shall not connect with, transport
to, or deliver natural gas to individuals, associations, copartnerships,
companies or corporations engaged in transporting or furnishing natural
gas to points, places or persons outside of this State.
Section 3. Foreign corporations formed for the purpose of, or engaged in
the business of transporting or transmitting natural gas by means of pipe
lines, shall never be licensed or permitted to conduct such business within
this State.
Id. at 239 n.l.
19. 221 U.S. at 246.
20. Id.
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violated the Commerce Clause, Oklahoma responded that the issue was
one of conservation, not commerce.2' While conceding that a state has
the right to preserve its supply of natural gas and prevent waste, the
Court distinguished the Oklahoma statute from other statutes whose
purported purpose was to prevent the waste of a natural resource.2
[The statute] does not protect the rights of all surface owners
against the abuses of any. It does not alone regulate the right
of the reduction to possession of the gas, but when the right
is exercised, when the gas becomes property, takes from it the
attributes of property, the right to dispose of it; indeed, selects
its market, to reserve it for future purchasers and use within
the State on the ground that the welfare of the state will
thereby be subserved. 3
The Court further noted that the purpose of the statute, conservation, was in a sense commercial; it protected or enhanced the business of
the welfare of the State.' As a general policy, the Court recognized the
consequences of the position advocated by Oklahoma:
If the States have such power, a singular situation might
result. Pennsylvania might keep its coal, the Northwest its
timber, the mining states their minerals. And why may not the
products of the field be brought within the principle? Thus
enlarged, or without that enlargement, its influence on
interstate commerce need not be pointed out ....If one state
has it; embargo may be retaliated by embargo, and commerce
will be halted at state lines.2'
In rejecting Oklahoma's position, the Court noted that the welfare
of one state was the welfare of all the states; the wealth and resources of
one state constituted the wealth and resources of all the states with each
state becoming greater by the division of resources with all of the
states.' The Court also noted that some states had imposed restrictions
on drilling for natural gas, but that such laws applied to all those who
would find and market natural gas irrespective of its destination.Y

21. Id. at 250.
22. Id. at 252-55.
23. Id. at 254-55.
24. Id. at 255.

25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 256.
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In its analysis of the Oklahoma statute, the Court upheld the
concept of the so-called "dormant aspect" of the Commerce Clause.2 In
other words, the Clause, of its own force, even in the absence of action
by Congress, constitutes a limitation on the States' ability to regulate the
transportation of articles in interstate commerce. '"he inaction of
Congress is a declaration of freedom from state interference with the
transportation of articles of legitimate interstate commerce, and this has
been the answer of the courts to contentions like those made in the case
at bar. "29
The next case, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. State of West
Virginia, involved a preference for in-state customers of natural gas,
rather than the out-right ban on natural gas exportation at issue in the
West case. In this case, West Virginia enacted a law which effectively
required all producers and transporters of natural gas within the State to
prefer in-state consumers over out-of-state consumers.3' As with the
West case, the law resulted from an increase in the population of West
Virginia and the desire to maximize the use of natural gas remaining in
the existing production fields. Additionally, West Virginia recognized that
in some areas of the state during the winter months, consumption already
exceeded production.' This level of consumption had already forced the
pipeline companies to voluntarily adopt a system of preferences for local
consumers.
In its analysis of the questions presented by the case, the Court
was obviously impressed by the cost of the impact of the law on

28. Id. at 239-62.
The Commerce Clause also can operate to invalidate state legislation even
in instances in which the federal government has not acted. Because that
clause is an express delegation to Congress of authority to regulate matters
in interstate commerce, those matters may be removed from state authority
regardless of whether Congress has exercised its power ....
In other
words, because the power to regulate interstate commerce has been
delegated to Congress, it is removed from the domain of the states.
Frank F. Skillern, Constitutionaland StatutoryIssues of Federalismin the Development of Energy
Resources, 17 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 533, 542 (1985).
29. 221 U.S. at 261.
30. 262 U.S. 553 (1923).
31. Section 1 of the West Virginia law read in pertinent part:
[Elvery person engaged in furnishing, or required by law ... to furnish,
natural gas for public use... shall to the extent of his supply of said gas
produced in this state ... furnish for the public use within the territory of
this state, and for the use of the public and every part of the public within
the territory of this state, in or from which such gas is produced... a
supply of natural gas reasonably adequate for the purposes... for which
natural gas is consumed or desired to be consumed by, the public ....
Id. at 582 n.1.
32. 262 U.S. at 588.
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neighboring states serviced by West Virginia pipelines.33 It recognized
preliminarily, that natural gas is an article of commerce subject to the
general rule that "[a] state law... which by its necessary operation
prevents, obstructs or burdens such transmission is a regulation of
interstate commerce-a prohibited interference."' The Court then
brushed aside the argument that the statute was constitutional since the
natural gas business was quasi-public in nature and, thus, properly
regulated by a state through its public utilities commission.
While the Pennsylvania case is important for its holding that the
Commerce Clause can be violated by a statute proposing less than a flat
prohibition on the export of a natural resource beyond state boundaries,
it is also important for the issues raised by the dissenting justices. In
stating his opinion that the Constitution does not prohibit a state from
securing a reasonable preference for its inhabitants, Justice Holmes
addressed the issue of whether natural gas was an article in commerce.
He noted that the statute in question sought to regulate natural gas before
it had begun to move in. commerce3 This led to his conclusion that "the
products of a State until they are actually started to a point outside it,
may be regulated by the State notwithstanding the commerce clause."'
While a logical extension of this statement arguably would have the
Court revive interstate commerce as it existed under the Articles of
Confederation, Holmes appears to base his opinion on a recognition of
States' rights under the Tenth Amendment rather than upon an analysis
of the reach of the Commerce Clause. Nevertheless, arguing that the
subject of a challenged statute is not an "article in commerce" is not
uncommon.3
The case of Cities Service Co. v. Peerless Co., examined
price-fixing as a method used to obtain the advantages of natural gas
development. In this case, the Oklahoma Corporation Commission
promulgated an order setting a minimum wellhead price on all gas taken

33. To change to other fuel for cooling and heating purposes would cost an average of
$100 per domestic consumer, or $30 million in Pennsylvania and $72.5 million in Ohio. Id.
at 590.
34. Id. at 596-97.
35. Id. at 597.
36. Dissenting opinions were filed by Justices Holmes, McReynolds, and Brandeis. Id. at
600-23.
37. 262 US. at 600. Taken to its logical conclusion, any statute, including those that
impose a flat prohibition on the interstate transportation of a resource, regulating a future
event could be held to regulate the resource before it had begun to move in commerce.
38. 262 U.S. at 600-01.
39. See infra notes 138-55 (discussion of Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941 (1982)); infra
notes 253-63 (discussion of City of Philadelphiav. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978)).
40. 340 U.S. 179 (1950).
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from the Guymon-Hugoton Field in Texas County, Oklahoma. The
Guymon-Hugoton Field lies in the states of Oklahoma, Texas and
Kansas.4' The order setting the minimum wellhead price resulted from
a. hearing at which the Commission concluded that the selling of gas at
the prevailing prices resulted in the economic and physical waste of gas,
loss to the producers and royalty owners and a loss to the State of gross
production taxes.'
In upholding the validity of the price-fixing order, the Court
noted that the Due Process and Equal Protection issues raised by the
appellant were without substance and that it was "undeniable that a state
may adopt reasonable regulations to prevent the economic and physical
waste of natural gas.'" The Court ruled that the price-fixing order was
lawful since it substantially related to a legitimate end, even though less
extensive measures might have sufficed."
Additionally, in what
appears to be a repudiation of the concept of the dormant power of the
Commerce Clause,' the Court stated:
It is now well settled that a state may regulate matters of local
concern over which federal authority has not been exercised,
even though the regulation has some impact on interstate
commerce ....
The only requirements consistently recognized
have been that the regulation not discriminate against or place
an embargo on interstate commerce, that it safeguard an
obvious state interest, and that the local interest at stake
outweigh whatever national interest there might be in the
prevention of state restrictions.46
While portions of Justice Clark's majority opinion can be
construed to signal a break in the long line of precedent recognizing the
dormant power of the Commerce Clause, there are points which
distinguish this case from earlier cases. First, the impact of the minimum
wellhead price was felt by all producers and consumers of the gas from
that particular field, irrespective of the destination of the gas or the
residence of the consumer. Second, since the order affected the price at
the wellhead only, it was more in the nature of a severance tax rather
than a use or transportation tax. Third, the order imposed a minimum
price only upon gas produced in the Guymon-Hugoton Field, rather than
on all gas produced in all fields located within the State. This fact gave

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. at 181.
Id. at 183.
Id. at 185.
Id. at 186.
See Skillem, supra note 28.
340 U.S. at 186-87 (citations omitted).
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the appearance of localized concern for waste in only a portion of the
State; While these points of distinction do not explain the Court's
sweeping statement that a state may regulate matters over which federal
authority has not been exercised, they do allow the Court to take a
narrower view of the issues raised by the statute, rather than the
traditional macrocosmic view of entire breadth of the Commerce Clause
power taken in earlier cases. Nevertheless, this case is indicative of a
perspective obviously favored by the States.
An important and more recent case involving the natural gas
resource is Maryland v. Louisiana.47 This case involved challenges
under the Commerce Clause and Supremacy Clause. The State of
Louisiana enacted a "first-use" tax on certain uses of natural gas brought
into the State. This first-use tax amounted to seven cents per thousand
cubic feet of natural gas on the first use of gas imported into Louisiana
that was not previously subjected to taxation by any other state or by the
federal government. This tax was equal to the severance tax imposed by
the State on Louisiana gas producers and was owed by the person or
entity owning the gas upon its first taxable use within the State. Since
most other states imposed a severance tax on the production of natural
gas, the primary impact of the first use tax was on gas produced in the
outer continental shelf (OCS), which is owned by the federal government,
and piped to processing plants located in Louisiana. The stated purpose
of the tax was to reimburse Louisiana for damages to the State's water
courses, barrier islands and coastal areas resulting from resource
exploitation, and to compensate the State for costs incurred in protecting
those resources. The tax was also designed to equalize competition
between gas produced in Louisiana, subject to the severance tax, and gas
produced elsewhere not subject to the severance tax. The tax act specified
a number of uses justifying the imposition of the first use tax including
sale, processing, transportation, treatment, use in manufacturing or "other
ascertainable action at a point within the state."
The tax act also
provided for a number of exemptions from, and credits for the first-use
tax. For example, the tax act provided a credit against the first-use tax for
any Louisiana severance tax owed in connection with the extraction of
natural resources within the state. Similarly, municipal and state-regulated electric generating plants and gas distributing services were
provided tax credits upon a showing that fuel costs for electricity
generation or natural gas distribution had increased as a direct result of
increases in the transportation or marketing costs of natural gas delivered
from the federal outer continental shelf. Also, natural gas imported into

47. 451 U.S. 725 (1981).
48. Id. at 732 (quoting 43 US.C. § 1302(8)).
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Louisiana which was used in the production of oil or gas within the state
was exempted from the first-use tax. In essence, the Louisiana consumers
of OCS gas were not burdened by the first-use tax, but the ta* uniformly
applied to gas moving outside of the State. Moreover, the tax act declared
that any contract which attempted to shift the cost of the tax to anyone
but the ultimate consumer, was unenforceable and against public policy.
The Court commenced its constitutional analysis of the first-use
tax by reviewing its propriety under the Supremacy Clause. This analysis
began with the assumption that Congress did not intend to replace state
law.49 The Court recognized that Congress may evidence its intent to
displace state law in several ways: 1)'The scheme of federal regulation
may be so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress
left no room for States to supplement it;" 2) an act of Congress may be so
dominant in an area that it will be assumed to preclude the enforcement
of state laws in the same area; 3) the objectives sought and obligations
imposed by the federal law may reveal the intent to preclude the
enforcement of state laws in the same area; or 4) the state laws may
produce a result inconsistent with the objective of the federal statute."
Correspondingly, the Court noted that where compliance with both the
state and federal laws is a physical impossibility, the state statute is
void."1 Ultimately, the Court applied the above principles to the first-use
tax and held the tax to be invalid since it conflicted with FERC 2
regulations which allowed the cost of the tax to be passed onto the
ultimate consumer of the gas.'
The Court then proceeded to analyze the validity of the first-use
tax under the Commerce Clause. "The State's right to tax interstate
commerce is limited, however, and no state tax may be sustained unless
the tax: 1) has a substantial nexus with the State; 2) is fairly apportioned;
3) does not discriminate against interstate commerce; and 4) is fairly
related to the services provided by the State."5' In imposing this test
upon the first-use tax, the Court noted, "One of the fundamental
principles of Commerce Clause jurisprudence is that no State, consistent

49. Id. at 746.

50. Id. at 747-48.
51. Id.
52. FERC, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, replaced the Federal Power
Commission in administering the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978.
53. 451 U.S. at 749-51. It should be noted that many aspects of natural gas regulation fall
within the jurisdiction of FERC since the passage of several federal laws including the
Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 (NGPA), 15 U.S.C. §717 et seq. Such laws and regulatory
schemes make any attempt by states to regulate the natural gas resource increasingly
vulnerable to Supremacy Clause invalidity.
54. 451 US. at 754 (citing Washington Revenue Dep't v. Washington Stevedaring Assn., 435
U.S. 734, 750 (1978)).
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with the Commerce Clause, may impose a tax which discriminates
against interstate commerce . . . by providing a direct commercial
advantage to local business."s The emphasis on this principle, part three
of the four part test applied in the case, may indicate that the Court
would more sympathetically treat a state tax that provides no direct
commercial advantages to local business, but arguably fails the other
three parts of the test. In applying this four-part test to the first-use tax
and its accompanying tax credit scheme, the Court effectively stated that
the tax passed muster under the first part of the test, particularly in light
of the tax's severability clause. 'While the local nexus of certain of the
uses is suspect, other uses would appear to have a substantial nexus so
that on the present record it would be difficult to say that the entire Tax
was unconstitutional on this ground."
The Court either omitted or merged its consideration of the
second part of the test with part three, the discriminatory impact of the
tax on interstate commerce. The application of this part of the test
doomed the tax. The Court held that, "[TIhe Louisiana First-Use Tax
unquestionably discriminates against interstate commerce in favor of local
interests as the necessary result of various tax credits and exclusions."5"
Noting that the tax burdened competitive natural gas users in other states
and favored those who both owned OCS gas and engaged in Louisiana
production, the Cou~rt stated: 'The obvious economic effect of this
Severance Tax Credit is to encourage natural gas owners involved in the
production of OCS gas to invest in mineral exploration and development
within Louisiana rather than to invest in further OCS development or
production in other states."s The Court then recognized that since the
system of tax credits allowed utilities producing electricity with OCS gas,
distributors of OCS gas and direct purchasers of OCS gas for consumption to recoup the increased cost of the gas, Louisiana consumers of OCS
gas were protected against the impact of the tax.?
The Court then applied the fourth prong of the test to the firstuse tax and held that, while the State had an interest in protecting its
natural resources, the first-use tax could not be said to be a compensatory
tax since it failed to afford an equality of treatment between local and
6
interstate commerce.w

55. Id. (quoting Northuestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 458
(1959)).
56. Id. at 754-55.
57. Id. at 756.
58. Id. at 756-57.
59. Id. at 757-58.
60. Id. at 759.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 35

The Louisiana first-use tax failed at least two parts of the
four-part test applied by the Court. In its analysis of the tax, the Court
dearly identified the characteristics of the interstate discrimination and
favoritism of local businesses as the most important aspects of the test.
This is consistent with the earlier natural gas resource cases which struck
down Oklahoma's flat prohibition on the transportation of natural gas out
of the State'1 and West Virginia's law requiring gas producers to favor
local consumers before transporting gas out of the State.' Similarly, the
emphasis on these characteristics is supported by the Court's approval of
the Oklahoma Corporation Commission's order applying a minimum
price at the wellhead to all producers taking gas from a particular gas
production field in the Cities Service case.' In general, the natural gas
cases demonstrate that generating revenue through a taxing mechanism
designed to provide direct commercial advantage to local businesses or
consumers at the expense of businesses or consumers on other states
violates the Commerce Clause. By the same token, a revenue generating
mechanism that is equally and uniformly applied to both in-state and
out-of-state concerns stands a better chance of passing muster.
The next case differs from the cases in this section, as well as
from other natural resource case in that; the Commerce Clause analysis
was applied not to the resource itself, but to a booming labor market
resulting from the discovery and exploitation of the natural resource. The
State of Alaska, in the case of Hicklin v. Orbeck," attempted to secure
the advantages of the exploitation of its oil and gas reserves through an
indirect method, requiring that Alaska citizens be given a hiring
preference over non-citizens.
In 1972, as a result of the discovery of large fields of oil and gas
and the impending construction of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline, the State
of Alaska enacted what became known as the "Alaska Hire" law. This law
provided in part that, "[All oil and gas leases, easements or right-of-way
permits for oil and gas pipeline purposes, utilization agreements, or any
renegotiation of any of the preceding to which the state is a party [shall
contain a provision] requiring the employment of qualified Alaska
residents [in preference to nonresidents]."' This same provision required

61. See West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911).
62. See Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923).
63. See Cities Service Co. v. Peerless Co., 340 U.S. 179 (1950).
64. 437 U.S. 518 (1978).
65. Id. at 520. See also ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 38.40.030(a) (1977), for the complete text of
the provision which reads as follows:
In order to create, protect and preserve the right of Alaska residents to
employment, the Commissioner of natural resources shall incorporate into
all oil and gas leases, easements or right-of-way permits for oil and gas
pipeline purposes, utilization agreements, or any re-negotiation of any of
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that all nonresidents be laid off before any resident working in the same
trade or craft was terminated." Section 38,40.090 of the Alaska Statutes
Annotated, defined a "resident" as a person who had been physically
present in the state for one year immediately prior to the time his status
is determined, maintained a residence, had established residency for
voting purposes, had not within the period or residency claimed
residence in any other state, and showed that his intent was to make
Alaska his permanent residence.' This employment preference for
Alaska residents was enforced by means of the issuance of certificates of
residence, or "resident cards" that were presented to an employer as proof
of residency. It was hoped that through the enforcement of the statute's
provisions, Alaska's employment problems would diminish or end. The
constitutionality of the Alaska Hire Law was challenged under the
Commerce Clause and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Art. IV,
Sec. 2.
In its analysis of the Privileges and Immunities Clause issue, the
Court recognized that the purpose of the Clause was to place the citizens
of each state on an equal footing with the citizens of other states, so far
as the advantages resulting from citizenship in those states are concerned.6 The Court noted that the Clause enforced the constitutional
entitlement of a resident of one state to travel to another state for the
purposes of employment, free from any discriminatory restrictions in
favor of state residents imposed by the other states. ' Quoting the cases
the preceding to which the state is a party provisions requiring the lessee
to comply with applicable laws and regulations with regard to the
employment of Alaska residents, a provision prohibiting discrimination
against Alaska residents and, when in the determination of the Commissioner of natural resources it is practicable, a provision requiring compliance with the Alaska Plan, all in accordance with the provisions of this
chapter.
66. ALASKA ADMUN. CODE tit. 35, § .011 (1977).
67. The full text of this provision reads as follows:
In this chapter
(1) "resident" means a person who
(A) except for brief intervals, military service, attendance at an educational
or training institution, or for absences for good cause, is physically present
in the state for a period of one year immediately before the time his status
is determined;
(B)maintains a place of residence in the state;
(C) has established residency for voting purposes in the state;
(D) has not, within the period or required residency claimed residency in
another state; and
(E)shows by all attending circumstances that his interest is to make Alaska
his permanent residence.
68. 437 U.S. at 524 (quoting Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180 (1864)).
69. 437 U.S. at 525.
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of Toomer v. Witsell and Mullany v. Anderson,' the Court noted the
rules of law applying to cases falling within the Privileges and Immunities Clause.
[The Privileges and Immunities Clause] [Dloes not preclude
disparity of treatment in many situations where there are
perfectly valid independent reasons for it, [citation omitted] it
does bar discrimination against citizens of other states where
there is no substantial reason for the discrimination beyond
the mere fact that they are citizens of other states. [citation
omitted]. A substantial reason for the discrimination would
not exist... unless there is something to indicate that non-citizens constitute a peculiar source of the evil at which the
[discriminatory] statute is aimed. Moreover, even where the
presence or activity of nonresidents causes or exacerbates the
problem the State seeks to remedy, there must be a reasonable
relationship between the danger represented by non-citizens,
as a class, and the... discrimination practiced on them.'
As applied to this case, the Court found that no showing was
made on the record that nonresidents were a "peculiar source of evil" the
Alaska Hire Law was enacted to remedy. No demonstration was made
that the flow of nonresidents into Alaska was causing the high unemployment of residents the law was attempting to correct. The Court noted
that the record on appeal did indicate that a major cause of Alaska's
unemployment was not the influx of nonresidents, but rather the fact that
a substantial number of jobless residents were unable to find employment
either because of their lack of education or training or because of their
geographic remoteness from available job opportunities.'
The Court held that, in addition to the fact that Alaska did not
demonstrate that nonresidents were the "peculiar source of evil," the
Alaska Hire law did not bear a "substantial relationship" to the "evil" the
nonresidents were said to present.
Alaska Hire simply grants all Alaskans, regardless of their
employment status, education, or training, a flat employment
preference for all jobs covered by the Act. A highly skilled and
educated resident who has never been unemployed is entitled
to precisely the same preferential treatment as the unskilled,

70. 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
71. 342 U.S. 415 (1952).
72. 437 U.S. at 525 (quoting Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948)).
73. 437 U.S. at 526-27. In a footnote, the Court quoted from the State's Memorandum in
Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Preliminary Injunction. This memorandum noted
that the unemployment of Alaska's Indian and Eskimo residents resulted, at least in part,
from under-education and lack of training. 437 U.S. at 527 n.10.
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habitually unemployed Arctic Eskimo enrolled in a job-training program. If Alaska is to attempt to ease its unemployment
problem by forcing employers within the State to discriminate
against nonresidents... the means by which it does so must
be more closely tailored to aid the unemployed the Act is
intended to benefit. Even if a statute granting an employment
preference to unemployed residents or to residents enrolled in
job-training programs might be permissible, Alaska Hire's
across-the-board grant of a job preference to all Alaskan
residents clearly is not.74
Alaska argued that since it owned the oil and gas, the subject of
the Alaska Hire law, the protections of the Privileges and Immunities
Clause did not attach. This argument could be interpreted as an attempt
to evoke the "market-participant" exemption to the Commerce Clause,
and apply it to the Privileges and Immunities Clause.' In response, the
Court noted that, not only does resource ownership not remove the
Alaska Hire law from Privileges and Immunities Clause scrutiny, but a
state's interest in regulating and controlling the resources it owns is not
absolute.76 A state's ownership of the resources which are the subject
of a challenged law is only one of the factors considered in the analysis
of the law's constitutionality under the Privileges and Immunities
Clause." Although the Court did note that the state-ownership factor is
often the crucial factor,' the Court reasoned that it was not the crucial
factor in this case; so much of the activity covered by the law was so far
removed from the fact of state-ownership of the resources, such
ownership provided no justifiable basis for the law. For example, the
Alaska Hire law reached many activities; "The provisions of this chapter
apply to all employment which is a result of oil and gas leases, easements, leases or right-of-way permits for oil or gas pipeline purposes,
utilization agreements or any renegotiation of any of the preceding to
which the state is a party .... "79 The breadth of the reach of this
provision over many common-place activities was limited only by the
requirement that the activity had to take place within the State and either
on the property under the control of the person subject to the law or be
directly related to the activity taking place on the property. 80 The
activity had to then be performed for the person subject to the law, his

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

437 U.S. at 527-28.
See supra note 16 and accompanying text; infra notes 183-92 and accompanying text.
437 US. at 528-29.
Id.
Id. at 529.
Id. See ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 38,40.50(a) (1977).
437 US. at 530.
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contractor or a subcontractor of the contractor or a supplier of either the
subcontractor or contractor 81 Under this section of the Alaska Hire law,
there were few activities within the State not covered by the law's
employment requirements. The law extended broadly to cover employers
who had no connection with the State's production of the oil and gas,
performed no work on state land, had no contractual relationship with
the State or had received no money from the State. Moreover, those
covered by the law would have included the out-of-state suppliers of
goods and services to contractors and subcontractors working in the
State. This expansive and extraterritorial nature of the Alaska Hire law
reinforced its unconstitutionality.
While the appellants in the Hicklin case raised no express
Commerce Clause challenge to the Alaska Hire law, the Court nevertheless recognized the common origin of the Commerce Clause and the
Privileges Immunities Clause as being Article 4 of the Articles of
Confederation.' Because of this common origin, the Court surveyed
several decisions explaining the reach and purpose of the Commerce
Clause. In noting that much of Alaska's oil and gas was bound for export
to places outside the State, the Court concluded its opinion by stating:
Although the fact that a state-owned resource is destined for
interstate commerce does not, of itself, disable the State from
preferring its own citizens in the utilization of that resource,
it does inform analysis under the Privileges and Immunities
Clause as to the permissibility of the discrimination the State
visits upon nonresidents based on its ownership of the
resource. Here, the oil and gas upon which Alaska hinges its
discrimination
against nonresidents are of profound national
3
importance8
The breadth of the Alaska Hire law's resident preference and the
interstate nature of the oil and gas industry and market combined to
insure the law's invalidity.
While the unconstitutionality of the law was based upon the
Privileges and Immunities Clause, much of the analysis used by the
Court is analogous to that used in Commerce Clause cases. Indeed, the
Court's Privileges and Immunities Clause analysis closely corresponds to
a traditional Commerce Clause test: the statute must serve a legitimate
local purpose that cannot be served as well by available nondiscriminatory means. Also, under the Commerce Clause, the Court has held that flat
prohibitions on the export of resources are per se invalid. Using the same

81. Id.
82. See supra note 3.
83. 437 U.S. at 533.
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rationale, the Court concluded that the preferential hiring scheme
established by Alaska was similarly invalid.
The natural gas and oil cases represent a range of regulatory
schemes in which Commerce Clause issues arise: 1) the out-right ban on
the interstate transportation of the resource; 2) the preference for in-state
use of the resource; 3) the establishment of a fixed price for the resource;
and, 4) the imposition of a tax on the use of the resource. While the
Commerce Clause analysis differs somewhat in each circumstance, the
Court's analysis focuses on the extent and purpose of the burden on
interstate commerce and its relationship to the interests of the state.
II. The Coal Resource
The case of Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, was
decided at approximately the same time as Maryland v. Louisiana. Unlike
the Louisiana case, the Court in Commonwealth Edison upheld the State of
Montana's severance tax on coal.
Since 1921, Montana had imposed a severance tax on coal mined
in the state. In 1975, after reviewing the results of a study on coal
production taxes, the state legislature enacted Montana Code Annotated
§15-35-101 et seq. This tax law imposed severance taxes on coal at varying
rates depending on the value, energy content and method of extraction
up to a maximum of thirty percent of the sales contract price. This tax
was levied upon coal mined from federal lands as well as that mined
from state and private lands. The constitutionality of the tax was
challenged on the basis of the Commerce Clause and the Supremacy
Clause.
The Court began its Commerce Clause analysis by stating
generally that a tax affecting interstate commerce is not immune from
scrutiny simply because it attaches only to a local or intrastate activity.'
Similarly, the Court also noted that state taxes levied on interstate
commerce are not per se invalid.' The Court then proceeded to apply
the four-part Complete Auto Transit" test, focusing on the practical effect
of the tax. At the outset, the appellants recognized that the tax satisfied
the first two prongs of the test; 1) the mining of coal in Montana had a
substantial nexus with the State of Montana, and 2) the tax was fairly
apportioned since the severance could occur in no other state and no

84. 453 U.S. 609, rek'g denied, 453 U.S. 927 (1980).
85. Id. at 615.
86. Id.
87. This is the same four-part test applied in Maryland v. Louisiana. The test originated in
the case of Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, reh'g. denied, 430 U.S. 976
(1977).
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other state could tax the severance in Montana.' However, the appellants strongly contested the constitutional validity of the tax under the
third and fourth prongs of the test. The appellants alleged that the tax
discriminated against interstate commerce since ninety percent of
Montana coal was shipped out of the state, shifting the tax burden
primarily to non-Montana utility companies and consumers. But the
Court responded:
[T]he Montana tax is computed at the same rate regardless of
the final destination of the coal, and there is no suggestion
here that the tax is administered in a manner that departs
from this evenhanded formula. We are not, therefore, confronted here with the type of differential tax treatment of
interstate and intrastate commerce that the Court has found in
other "discrimination" cases. 9
The Court rejected the claim that a tax must be considered
discriminatory and thus, unconstitutional where the tax burden is borne
primarily by out-of-state consumers: "Consequently, to accept appellants'
theory... would require a significant, and in our view, unwarranted
departure from the rationale of our prior discrimination cases."' The
rejection of this claim is interesting in view of the Court's statement that
its analysis focused primarily on the practical effect of a challenged
tax.91 The appellants' theory certainly demonstrated that the practical
effect of the tax was to shift ninety percent of the tax burden to out-ofstate consumers. It would seem that the practical effect of the tax in this
case would require a finding of discrimination. The Court was nevertheless persuaded that, since the tax burden was borne by in-state and
out-of-state consumers alike according to the amount of coal consumed
and not according to any distinction between in-state and out-of-state
consumers, no discrimination existed. Importantly, the Court noted: "We
are not convinced that the Commerce Clause, of its own force, gives the
residents of one State, the right to control in this fashion the terms of
resource development and depletion in a sister State."' In other words,
while the resources of one state are conceptually the resources of all
states, the Commerce Clause does not foreclose a state from reaping the
financial benefits of resource production or exploitation at the expense of
a sister state's need or desire for the resources or sense of "fairness." The
Court found no basis for appellants' view that the Commerce Clause

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

453 U.S. at 617.
Id. at 618.
Id. at 619.
Id. at 615.
Id. at 619.
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injected antitrust principles into relations between States." The Court
ended its third-prong analysis of the severance tax by recognizing that
the appellants conceded that Montana may impose some severance tax
on coal mined in the State, and that their argument that the tax was
invalid rested upon the contention that it was excessive." This recognition introduced the fourth prong of the test, that the tax be fairly related
to the services provided by the State.
The Court began the fourth-prong analysis by reviewing the
purposes of various taxes imposed by states. Since the Montana Supreme
Court had held the purpose of the severance tax to be for the general
support of the government, the Court characterized the tax as a general
revenue tax.s This characterization was made in spite of the fact that
fifty percent of the revenues generated by the tax were deposited into a
trust fund. A general revenue tax differs from "user fees" or other taxes
in that the latter taxes are designed as a specific charge imposed by a
state on the use of state-owned or state-provided facilities or services.
This characterization of the tax was critical to the Court's analysis in view
of the statement that, "there is no requirement under the Due Process
Clause that the amount of general revenue taxes collected from a

particular activity must be reasonably related to the value of the services
provided to the activity."9 Instead, such taxes are a valid means of
distributing the burden of the cost of government, irrespective of the
benefits, or lack thereof, experienced by those who pay the tax.' The
reader of this portion of the Court's opinion may be alarmed by the
apparent unreasoned and unexpected jump from a Commerce Clause

analysis of the tax to a Due Process Clause analysis. As a result, it is
questionable whether any difference between the two analyses exists. In
explanation, the Court proceeded to note, 'There is no reason to suppose
that [the] latitude afforded the States under the Due Process Clause is

93. Id.
Nor do we share the appellants' apparent view that the Commerce Clause
injects the principles of antitrust law into the relations between the States by
reference to such imprecise standards as whether one state is "exploiting its
monopoly" position with respect to a natural resource when the flow of
commerce among them is not otherwise impeded. The threshold questions
whether a State enjoys a "monopoly" position and whether the tax burden is
shifted out of State, rather than borne by in-state producers and consumers,
would require complex factual inquiries about such issues as elasticity of the
demand for the product and alternative sources of supply....
Id. at 619 n.8.
94. 453 U.S.at 620.
95. Id. at 621.
96. Id. at 622.
97. Id.
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somehow divested by the Commerce Clause merely because the taxed
activity has some connection to interstate commerce, particularly when
the tax levied on an activity is conducted within the State."8 With this
in mind, the Court further noted that there was no question that Montana
could raise general revenues through the imposition of a coal severance
tax. In fact, by 1979, thirty-three states had adopted some type of
severance tax." Therefore, the inquiry under the fourth prong of the
test is not the amount of the tax or the value of the benefits granted as
measured by the costs incurred by the State on account of the taxpayers'
activities. Rather, the propriety of the tax is measured by whether it is
reasonably related to the extent of the contact of the taxpayer with the
taxing state."° In other words, the measure of the tax must be tied to
the earnings which the State has made possible for the taxpayer."°1 In
this sense, the fourth prong. of the test relates closely to the first part or
substantial nexus prong of the four-part Complete Auto Transit test. There
need be no relationship between the amount of the tax and costs incurred
by the state on account of the taxpayer's activity. In any case, the Court
concluded that the rate of a general revenue tax is up to the legislature.
Under this analysis, the Court held the Montana general revenue
severance tax to be constitutional under the Commerce Clause, distinguishing it from Louisiana's more specific first-use tax held unconstitutional in Maryland v. Louisiana.
The appellants also contended that, since the tax was imposed on
coal mined on federal lands, it was preempted by the Mineral Leasing
Act of 19 2 0 ." Since, however, section 189 of that Act expressly allowed
for the imposition of taxes upon any lessee of the United States, the
Supremacy Clause did not invalidate the tax. The Court also held that the
tax did not frustrate national energy policy.
While many have criticized the decision in Commonwealth Edison
as sanctioning the unfair financial advantage of the "have" or resourcewealthy states over the "have-not" states, the decision is valuable in
distinguishing the Louisiana case and explaining the nuances of the
Complete Auto Transit test. It now seems clear that severance taxes,
uniform in their imposition, raising general revenues for the taxing state,
are valid.yu
98. Id. at 623.
99. 453 U.S. at 624 n.13 (1980).
100. Id. at 626.

101. Id.
102. 30 U.S.C. § 181.
103. See also Skillern, supra note 28, at 620-21. 'States now dearly have the authority to
use severance taxes for general revenue purposes. It may be possible for a state to establish
severance taxes on new resources or to increase existing taxes and, in the process, allow
other tax relief to its residents." Id.
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In the case of Wyoming v. Oklahoma,"0 ' the Court dealt with
Oklahoma's attempt to reduce its reliance on Wyoming coal in its
coal-fired electric generating plants. Wyoming, a coal-exporting state,
imposed a severance tax on coal produced in the state. Wyoming had
collected severance taxes on the coal extracted by eight mining companies
that sold coal to four Oklahoma electric utilities. In 1985, the Oklahoma
legislature adopted a resolution "requesting Oklahoma utility companies
using coal-fired generating plants to consider plans to blend ten percent
Oklahoma coal with their present use of Wyoming coal, thereby keeping
a portion of ratepayer dollars in Oklahoma and promoting economic
development.""°5 None of the four privately-owned utilities using
coal-fired generating plants nor the Grand River Dam Authority (GRDA),
an agency of the State of Oklahoma, heeded the resolution."0 ' At its
next session, the legislature enacted the resolution into law.'07
The evidence revealed that prior to enacting the resolution into
law, the four privately-owned utilities purchased virtually all of their coal
from Wyoming.'0 After the effective date of the Act, the utilities
reduced their purchases of Wyoming coal in favor of Oklahoma coal."°
As a result, Wyoming lost severance taxes amounting to $535,886 in 1987
and $542,352 in 1988." ° The evidence also showed that Wyoming had

104. 502 US. 437 (1992).
105. 502 US. at 443 (quoting Okla. S. Res. 21, 40th Leg., 1985, OKiA. Siss. LAWS 1694).
WHEREAS, the use of Oklahoma coal would save significant freight
charges on out-of-state coal from the State of Wyoming; and
WHEREAS, the savings on such freight charges could offset any possible
costs associated with plant adjustments; and
WHEREAS, the coal-fired electric plants being used by Oklahoma utilities
are exdusively using Wyoming coal; and
WHEREAS, the Oklahoma ratepayers are paying $300 million annually for
Wyoming coal; and
WHEREAS, a 1982 Ozark Council Report states that $9 million of the
ratepayers dollars was paid as severance tax to the State of Wyoming....
NOW, THEREFIORE, BE IT RESOLVED....
THAT Oklahoma utilities using coal-fired generating plants seriously
consider using a blend of at least ten percent Oklahoma coal with
Wyoming coal and continue to meet air quality standards.
THAT the result of such a blend would assure at least a portion of the
ratepayer dollars remaining in Oklahoma and enhancing the economy of
the State of Oklahoma.
Id.
106. 502 U.S. at 444.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 444-45.
109. Id. at 445.
110. Id.
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significant excess mining capacity, so that the loss of sales could not be
made up by sales in other areas."'
After holding this case was appropriate for the Court's exercise
of original jurisdiction, that the Court accepted the Special Master's
conclusion that the Oklahoma Act on its face, and in practical effect,
discriminated against interstate commerce. 2 Citing New Energy Co. v.
Limbach, the Court noted the applicable test to be applied in this case:
"[wihen a state statute clearly discriminates against interstate commerce,
it will be struck down... unless the discrimination is demonstrably
justified by a valid factor unrelated to economic protectionism.""' The
Court characterized the portion of the Act that reserved a segment of the
Oklahoma coal market for Oklahoma-mined coal to be protectionist and
discriminatory, and it was Oklahoma's burden to justify "it both in terms
of the local benefits flowing from the statute and the unavailability of
nondiscriminatory alternatives adequate to preserve the local interests at
stake."" 4 The Court recognized that while Commerce Clause cases are
evaluated by one of two tests; the strict scrutiny standard of the
Hughes1 s case and the less strict standard of the PVe" case, there is no
clear line separating the "close cases". According to the Court, this case
was not a close case."7
Oklahoma's first attempt to meet its burden began with the
argument that the Act's discrimination against out-of-state coal was
justified because it lessened the State's reliance on a single source of coal
delivered over a single rail line. The State "embellished" this argument by
suggesting that requiring the utilities to supply ten percent of their coal
needs from Oklahoma, which because of its higher sulfur content could.
not be the primary source of supply, the State was conserving Wyoming's
cleaner-burning coal for future use."' However, to the extent that this
goal was a legitimate goal for the State to pursue, the State's attempt to
achieve it by isolating itself from the national economy violated the
Commerce Clause." 9 The Court gave little additional shrift to this
argument except to say that it was raised for the first time in the State's
brief on the merits and that it found no support in the record. 1 °

111. Id. at 445-46.

112. Id. at 455.
113. Id. at 454 (citing Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986)).
114. Id. at 456 (quoting Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 US. 322, 336 (1979)).

115. See infra notes 221-31 and accompanying text.
116. See infra notes 195-202 and accompanying text.

117. 502 U.S. at 455 n.12.
118. Id. at 457.
119. Id. at 456-57.

120. Id. at 457.
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Oklahoma then argued that the Federal Power Act 2' permitted
the discriminatory impact on interstate commerce. However, the Court
found no clear congressional intent permitting such a violation of the
Commerce Clause.'
Lastly, in its exceptions to the Special Master's recommendations,
Wyoming argued that the market-participant exception to the operation
of the Commerce Clause was not available to Oklahoma even though a
state-owned utility was impacted by the operation of the Act.' The
Special Master recommended that either the Court dismiss the suit as to
the GRDA or look to Oklahoma law and find the Act severable.'24
However, the Court found the Act to be unseverable; nothing remined
to be saved once a portion of the Act was declared unconstitutional."
The results of the Wyoming case are consistent with the Court's
precedent, namely, that laws whose provisions are discriminatory on
their face are subject to the strict scrutiny standards of the Hughes'26
case. Those standards require the state to justify the discriminatory
impact of a law in terms of the local benefits derived from the statute and
the unavailability of nondiscriminatory alternatives to address the local
interests.

121. 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (1985).
122. According to the State's argument, the Federal Power Act's "savings clause," 16
U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (1985), reserves to the States the regulation of local retail electric rates:
The provisions of this subchapter shall apply to the transmission of electric
energy in interstate commerce and to the sale of electric energy at
wholesale in interstate commerce, but except as provided in paragraph (2)
shall not apply to any other sale of electric energy or deprive a State or
State commission of its lawful authority now exercised over the exportation
of hydroelectric energy which is transmitted across a State line.
502 U.S. at 457. The State argued that since it had determined that helpful ways of ensuring
lower local utility rates included reducing over-dependence on a single source of supply and
conserving low-sulfur coal for future use, the Act's discriminatory impact was exempt from
Commerce Clause scrutiny. The Court held that Congress, in passing the above provision,
had not manifested the unambiguous intent to allow alteration of the limits of state power
otherwise imposed by the Commerce Clause. Id. at 458 (quoting New England Power Co. v.
New Hampshire,455 U.S. 331 (1982); United States v. Public Utilities Comm'n of California, 345
U.S. 295, 304 (1953)).
The observation is inescapable that the above provision expressly applies to the States'
authority over the exportation of hydroelectric energy.
123. 502 US. at 459.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 460.
126. See infra note 221 and accompanying text.
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III. The Water Resource
Interstate transportation of water resources raises Commerce
Clause issues particularly in the western states where scarce water is
needed for most types of economic development. One of the first water
resource cases was Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter."1 In that case, the
appellant had contracted to, and had in fact, laid water mains in the city
of Bayonne, New Jersey for the purpose of carrying water from the
Passaic River to Staten Island, New York. Shortly thereafter, the New
Jersey legislature enacted a law stating in part: "It shall be unlawful for
any person or corporation to transport or carry, through pipes, conduits,
ditches or canals, the waters of any fresh water lake, pond, brook, creek,
river or stream of this State into any other State, for use therein.""I The
stated purpose for the statute was the need to preserve the fresh water
of the State for the health and prosperity of its citizens. After the passage
of this statute, Hudson Water Co. contracted with the City of New York
to furnish not less than three million gallons of water per day.
The Court assumed, as did the court below, that Hudson Water
Co. represented the rights of a riparian owner, having no special charter
giving it any more extensive powers. In recognition of States' rights
under the Tenth Amendment, the Court noted that, "the State as
quasi-sovereign and representative of the interests of the public has a
standing in court to protect the atmosphere, the water and the forests
within its territory, irrespective of the assent or dissent of the private
owners of the land most immediately concerned."'" The Court then
held that riparian water law principles would not sanction the diversion
of an important stream outside the boundaries of the state in which it
flowed,13° and that "The private right to appropriate [water] is subject
not only to the rights of lower owners but to the initial limitation that it
may not substantially diminish one of the great foundations of public
welfare and health."13' The Court stated further, "We are of the opinion, further, that the constitutional power of the State to insist that its
natural advantages shall remain unimpaired by its citizens is not
dependent upon any nice estimate of the extent of present use or
speculation as to future needs.""2 These pronouncements indicate that
the Court viewed the water resource as more important than perhaps
other resources, thus, giving a state more power to control its use and

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

209 U.S. 349 (1908).
Id. at 353.
Id. at 355.
Id. at 356.
Id.
Id. at 356-57.
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movement outside state boundaries. The Court concluded that 'The right
to receive water from a river through pipes is subject to territorial limits
by nature, and those limits may be fixed by the State within which the
river flows, even if they are made to coincide with the state line."' As
distinguished from other natural resources, the Court noted that, "A man
cannot acquire a right to property by his desire to use it in commerce
among the States. Neither can he enlarge his otherwise limited and
qualified right to the same end."" This statement may imply that the
Commerce Clause would not protect the interstate transportation of this
valuable resource from state regulation, even though the riparian owner
had full ownership rights to the water he was proposing to transport.
Because water is one of the few resources absolutely essential for human
life, it is not surprising that the Court recognized greater state police
power authority over it than had been recognized in the case of other
natural resources.
This decision, however, followed the doctrines of Geer v.
Connecticut,13 where the Court held that wild animals within the
borders of a state are owned by the state for the benefit of all its people.
Geer and its public interest and ownership rationale was expressly
overruled by Hughes v. Oklahoma.1 ' To the extent that the decision
in Hudson Water relied on the doctrines of Geer, instead of principles of
riparian water law, the authority of the decision is in question.' 7 This
is true particularly in light of the Court's opinion in Sporhase v.
Nebraska, wherein the Court reached the opposite result."
Sporhase v. Nebraska, 39 involved the interstate transportation
of groundwater. Sporhase owned adjoining tracts of land in Colorado and
Nebraska and used water pumped from a well located in Nebraska to
irrigate both tracts. The law suit involved a challenge to the validity of
a Nebraska statute restricting the withdrawal of groundwater from any

133. Id. at 357.
134. Id.
135. 161 U.S. 519 (1896).
136. 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
137. Accord Walter Hellerstein, Hughes v. Oklahoma: The Court, the Commerce Clause, and
State Control of Natural Resources, 1979 SUP. CT. REv. 51, 91.
138. 458 U.S. 941 (1982). See discussion below.
139. Id. An extremely interesting treatment of the Sporhase case from a state water law
perspective and analysis of why a "territorial-opportunity cost theory," and not the Pike
analysis should be applied to cases involving the interstate transportation of water is found
in Frank J.Trelease, InterstateUse of Water-"Sporhasev, El Paso,Pike and Vermejo," 22 LAND
& WATER L. REV. 315, 319 (1987).
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well in Nebraska intended for use in another state.14° The challenge
involved three Commerce Clause issues: 1) whether groundwater was an
article in commerce, and subject to the Commerce Clause; 2) whether
Congress had granted the States permission to engage in the regulation
of groundwater; and 3) whether the Nebraska restriction requiring a
permit for the interstate transportation of groundwater constituted an
impermissible burden on commerce.
In analyzing the first of the three issues, the Court distinguished
the law governing the ownership of groundwater in Nebraska from Texas
law which had been the subject of an earlier case, 4' noting that in states
following the Texas rule, groundwater is an article in commerce.'4 In
Nebraska, the rule of law differed, a land-owner could not withdraw
water in excess of that which could be reasonably and beneficially used
on his land. Also, if the amount of groundwater was insufficient for all
owners, each owner was entitled only to a reasonable portion of the
whole. In holding that groundwater was also an article in commerce
under the Nebraska rule, the Court noted that Nebraska's attempt to
regulate the interstate transportation of the water rested on the rejected
public ownership theory of the Geer decision." A state's regulatory
power has never been dependent on the public ownership of the
regulated commodity.'" The Court noted that even though water is
necessary for human survival, most water supplies are used for agriculture, which is commercial in nature and interstate in dimension. The
Court then concluded by recognizing the interstate character of the
Ogallala aquifer, from which the subject water was drawn and the
attendant significant federal interest in conserving and allocating the

140. Nebraska Revised Statutes Section 46-613.01 (1957) provided:
Any person, firm, city, municipal corporation or any other entity intending
to withdraw groundwater from any well or pit located in the State of
Nebraska and transport it for use in an adjoining state shall apply to the
Department of Water Resources for a permit to do so. If the Director of
Water Resources finds that the withdrawal of the groundwater requested
is reasonable, is not contrary to the conservation and use of groundwater,
and is not otherwise detrimental to the public welfare, he shall grant the
permit if the state in which the water is to be used grants reciprocal rights
to withdraw and transport groundwater from that state for use in the State
of Nebraska.
141. In City of Altus v. Carr,255 F. Supp. 828 (W.D.Tex.), affd mem., 385 U.S. 35 (1966), the
Court affirmed a lower court decision invalidating a Texas statute forbidding the interstate
transportation of groundwater.
142. Under the Texas rule, a land-owner could use all of the percolating water captured
from wells on his land for any beneficial purpose, on or off the land, including the sale of
the water to others outside the drainage basin.
143. See infra note 206 and accompanying text.
144. 458 U.S. at 952.
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water." As a result of the Court's broad language, under most, if not
all state rules, water will be considered to be an article in commerce for
Commerce Clause purposes. In addition, the Court also appeared to
retreat from the language of Hudson Water which tended to make water
more susceptible to state regulation.
The Court proceeded to examine the third issue, whether the
Nebraska statute was an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce' by applying the rationale of Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc." 7
Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a
legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate
commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the
burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in
relation to the putative local benefits. If a legitimate local
purpose is found, then the question becomes one of degree.
And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of
course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and
on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact
on interstate activities."'
The Court determined that the only purpose of the statute was the
conservation and preservation of diminishing supplies of groundwater,
a legitimate and highly important purpose. However, the fact that the
statute addressed only interstate transfers and not intrastate transfers of
water from areas of shortage demonstrated a lack of evenhandedness in
regulation."
The lack of evenhandedness was further demonstrated

145. Id. at 953.
146. Interestingly, the Court, in dictum, appeared to retreat from its past recognition of
the so-called "dormant" power of the Commerce Clause by stating, "For the existence of
unexercised federal regulatory power does not foreclose state regulation of its water
resources, of the uses of water within the State, or indeed, of interstate commerce in water."
458 US. at 954.
147. 397 US. 137, 142 (1970).
148. 458 US. at 954.
149. Trelease argues that: 'The Pike test requires the state to regulate 'even-handedly.'
This does not mean, cannot mean, a simple erasure of the state line." Trelease, supra note
139, at 333. In support of this statement, Trelease stated that:
The entire purpose of the [water permit application] process is to exercise
sovereignty over the state's resources for the benefit of the state-the very
purpose for which it is a state. Water is territory as much as land; it is part
of the resource base of the state. And, indeed a state's natural resources-land, water, and minerals-are more than territory; they are the
patrimony of the state. To argue that it has a duty to share this patrimony
with other states who may take it away for their own benefit is to diminish
and distort the very basis upon which the state was founded. It is fatuous
to say that it is not 'legitimate' for a state to choose the beneficiaries of
grants of resources under its control.
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by the Nebraska statute's reciprocity provision;us° since Colorado
prohibited the exportation of groundwater, the reciprocity provision
constituted an absolute barrier to groundwater commerce between the
states. In this situation, application of the Pike rationale required a close
connection between the reciprocity provision and the local purpose
asserted by the statute. The Court held that the reciprocity requirement
failed the "strictest scrutiny" test, "For there is no evidence that this
restriction is narrowly tailored to the conservation and preservation
The Court noted that while a demonstrably arid state
rationale."'
able
to
accumulate sufficient evidence to establish a means-end
might be
relationship between a total ban on the exportation of water and the
purpose to conserve and preserve water, no such evidence existed in this
case.152 Simply stated, the Court recognized the legitimacy of the
statute's purpose to conserve and preserve water, but ruled that the
severe impact of the statute on interstate commerce was not justified by
the benefits to the locality.'
The Court similarly rejected Nebraska's suggestion that Congress
had authorized the States to engage in the regulation of groundwater in
a manner which would otherwise be impermissible. Nebraska pointed to
numerous federal statutes but limited its analysis to section eight of the
Reclamation Act of 1902,"s4 which provides that nothing in the Act shall

150. 458 U.S. at 957-58.
151. 458 U.S. at 957-58. The conservation and preservation of water are recognized as
legitimate objects of state and local regulation. "It goes without saying that a state may deny
an appropriation to anybody, local and foreigners alike, on environmental grounds, such
as the preservation of a lake or water fall. That kind of conservation is certainly permissible
even where the burden is on out-of-staters and the benefit is to the local people." Trelease,
supra note 139, at 334.
152. 458 US. at 958.
153. Professor Trelease opined that in deciding between two conflicting applicants for an
appropriation of water, one inside the state and the other an exporter of the water to
another state, even-handedness exists even though the state engineer might require of the
latter a payment of cash or the addition of extra features to the proposed project that would
allow small communities in the locality to receive water or share in the benefits of the
project.
Aside from this, even if the exporter clearly has to make a contribution or
bear costs not imposed upon the local user, this is even-handed treatment,
as long as he is making some contribution to the state of origin's economy
equivalent to what would have been made by a use within the state. If
there is a "duty to share," as Professor Tarlock said, (footnote omitted) it
means at least to share on equal terms with the local appropriator. Some
attempt, however rough, to equate the "extra" burden imposed on the
exporter with the opportunity costs to the state, or to require a cash
contribution to replace lost taxes, is certainly not unequal treatment.
Trelease, supra note 139, at 334.
154. 32 Stat. 390 (1902).
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be construed to affect or interfere with the laws of any state relating to
the control, use or distribution of water. The Act also provides that the
Secretary of the Interior shall act in conformity with the provisions of
such state laws. Nebraska also referred to several interstate compacts
regarding the rights to surface water. In response, the Court noted that
nowhere in any of the statutes or interstate compacts cited by Nebraska,
did Congress manifest an intent to remove constitutional restraints on
such state laws. The Court then stated:
Neither the fact that Congress has chosen not to create a
federal water law to govern water rights involved in federal
projects, nor the fact that Congress has been willing to let the
States settle their differences over water rights through mutual
agreement, constitutes persuasive evidence that Congress
consented to the unilateral imposition of unreasonable burdens
on commerce. In the instances in which we have found such
consent, Congress .. intent and policy" to sustain state legislation from attack under the Commerce Clause was 'expressly
stated.' '
While there were several flaws of constitutional magnitude in the
Nebraska statute, the presence of reciprocity requirement was the basis
of the Court's holding that the statute violated the Commerce Clause.
However, since the statute also contained a severability clause, the case
was remanded to the state courts to determine whether the invalid
portion was severable from the remainder of the law.
IV. The Electricity Resource
While water and coal are important natural resources that states
seek to preserve or exploit for the use and benefit of their citizens, they
are also used in the production of electricity. The case of New England
Power Co. v. New Hampshire' presented Commerce Clause issues in
the context of the exportation of hydroelectricity. The New England
Power Company, a public utility, owned twenty-seven generating units
in six hydroelectric generating stations on the Connecticut River.
Twenty-one of the units, with a capacity of 419.8 megawatts, or approximately ten percent of the company's entire generating capacity, were
located within the State of New Hampshire. Each of these units was
appropriately licensed by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC). The New England Power Company was a member of the New
155. 458 U.S. at 960 (quoting New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 US. 331,
343 (1982) (quoting Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 427 (1946))) (footnote

omitted).
156. 455 US. 331 (1982).
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England Power Pool, whose members owned over ninety-eight percent
of the total generating capacity and all of the transmission facilities in a
six-state region. One of the objectives of the Pool was to assure the
reliability of the region's bulk power through joint planning and the
central dispatching of electricity. The Pool's central computer assigned an
operating schedule to each generating unit in order to maximize the
efficiency of electricity generation. The electricity so generated then
flowed freely through the Pool's transmission lines to customers
according to their needs but without regard to the generating source. The
Pool's central office then billed each customer the amount it would have
cost an individual utility to meet the customer's load using its own
generating sources, minus that member's share of the savings resulting
from the centralized dispatch system.
At issue in the case was the validity of a 1913 New Hampshire
statute which provided:
No corporation engaged in the generation of electrical energy
by water power shall engage in the business of transmitting or
conveying the same beyond the confines of the state, unless it
shall first file notice of its intention so to do with the public
utilities commission and obtain an order of said commission
permitting it to engage in such business."7
This statute allowed the state public utilities commission to prohibit the
exportation of electricity outside of the state when it determined that the
energy "[I]s reasonably required for use within th[e] state and that the
public good requires that it be delivered for such use.IS
On September 19, 1980, after an investigation and hearings, the
utilities commission withdrew the authority granted to New England
Power for the past fifty-four years, to export its electric energy outside
the State. The Commission also ordered New England Power to arrange
to sell the previously exported energy to customers inside the State. The
Commission based its withdrawal of authority and subsequent order on
the finding that New Hampshire's population and energy needs were
increasing very rapidly; that because of the State's low "generating mix"
of hydroelectricity, the State's largest electric utility had generating costs
twenty-five percent higher than those of New England Power; and, that
if New England Power sold its electricity exclusively to in-state customers, these customers would save substantial amounts of money.'" In
other words, the discontinuance of exporting the energy would serve the
"public good" of New Hampshire. Since, however, the Commission did
157. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 374:35 (1966).
158. Id.
159. The Court noted that annual savings would approach $25 million. 455 U.S. at 336.
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not order New England Power to sever its relationship with the Pool,
electricity generated by New England Power would continue to flow out
of the State. The Commission apparently required New England Power
to sell its electricity to in-state customers at an amount equal to the
output of its in-state generating facilities, at special rates adjusted to
reflect the savings attributable to the usual low cost generation of the
Pool.
Relying on the rule of earlier cases, the Court reiterated that "a
State is without power to prevent privately owned articles of trade from
being shipped or sold in interstate commerce on the ground that they are
required to satisfy local demands or because they are needed by the
people of the State." " The Court also noted:
Our cases consistently have held that the Commerce Clause of
the Constitution, Art. I, §8, cl. 3, precludes a state from
mandating that its residents be given a preferred right of
access, over out of state consumers, to natural resources
located
within its borders to the products derived there161
from.

In rejecting New Hampshire's attempt to distinguish past cases
from the present by arguing that it "owned" the Connecticut River, the
source of the electricity, the Court noted that the federal government had
jurisdiction over the river which was a navigable water of the United
States and had licensed the generating units." The Court also noted
that the electricity generated from the flow of the river was distinct from
the waters which the state assertedly owned; electricity is a product
manufactured by the person or corporation owning the generating
facilities."
In conclusion, the Court held that the New Hampshire
statute was precisely the sort of protectionist regulation that the
Commerce Clause was drafted to eliminate.
New Hampshire contended that Congress had given the States
the authority to impose this type of regulation quoting section 201(b) of,
the Federal Power Act which states that the exclusive federal jurisdiction
to regulate the rates governing the interstate sales of electricity, "shall not
...deprive a State or State Commission of its lawful authority now
exercised over the exportation of hydroelectric energy which is transmit-

160. 455 U.S. at 338 (quoting Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1 (1928)).
See also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979); Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617
(1978); Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 US. 553 (1923); West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co.,
221 US. 229 (1911).
161. 455 U.S. at 338.
162. Id. n.6.
163. Id.
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ted across a State line."1" Noting that this section in no sense constituted a congressional grant of power to States to burden interstate commerce in an otherwise impermissible way, the Court held that the section
did nothing more than leave standing valid state laws regulating the
transmission of hydroelectric energy." Section 201(b) simply saved
valid state laws from the preemptive affect of the comprehensive scheme
of federal regulation found in the Federal Power Act. As in the Sporhase
case, the Court consistently ruled that any congressional intent to shield
a state1 law from Commerce Clause invalidation must be expressly
stated. 66
The case of Arizona Public Service Co. v. Snead"6 demonstrated
an attempt by a state to gain the financial advantages of in-state electric
generation without flatly prohibiting the export of energy beyond the
state lines. In many ways this case foreshadowed the Court's opinion in
Maryland v. Louisiana.1"
In the Snead case, New Mexico had imposed a tax on the
privilege of generating electricity within its borders. Before 1975, New
Mexico levied a four percent gross receipts tax on the retail sales of
electricity. This tax impacted primarily out-of-state consumers, since most
of the electricity generated in New Mexico was transmitted to other
western states. In 1975, the New Mexico legislature enacted the Electrical
Energy Tax Act which imposed a tax on the generation of electricity at
the rate of four-tenths of a mill on each net kilowatt hour generated.1"
Significantly, this tax was imposed on all companies generating electricity
in the State. The Act, however, also provided that this energy tax may be
credited against the company's gross receipts tax liability. This resulted
in the ability of a generating company to offset the energy tax against the
four percent retail sales tax when the electricity was sold within the State
of New Mexico. Of course, when the electricity was sold outside of the
State, there was no gross receipts tax against which to offset the energy
tax liability.
The Court reviewed the constitutionality of the tax first under the
Supremacy Clause, noting that section 2121(a) of the Tax Reform Act of
1976 prohibited a state from imposing a tax on the generation or
transmission of electricity which discriminates against out-of-state

164. 455 US. at 341 (quoting § 201(b) of the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 791 et seq.
(1976 ed. and Supp. IV)).
165. 455 U.S. at 341.
166. See 455 U.S. at 343. See also Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941 (1982).
167. 441 U.S. 141 (1979).
168. See Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725 (1981).
169. According to the Court, this was approximately a two percent tax on the retail value
of the electricity. 441 U.S. at 143.
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consumers.17° For purposes of this federal law, a discriminatory tax was
one which results, directly or indirectly, in a greater burden on electricity
which is generated or transmitted in interstate commerce than on
electricity generated and transmitted in intrastate commerce. In fact, a
review of the legislative history disclosed that this provision of the 1976
Act was specifically aimed at the New Mexico energy tax."
Under the guise of the Supremacy Clause analysis, the Court
launched into the Commerce Clause implications of the tax: "Because the
electrical energy tax itself indirectly but necessarily discriminates against
1
electricity sold outside New Mexico, it violates the federal statute."
In a footnote to this sentence, the Court noted that this was not a case
where the State has imposed an "evenhanded" tax." The Court, no
doubt heavily influenced by its analysis of the impact of the 1976 Act,
continued with its implicit Commerce Clause analysis by noting that the
New Mexico tax interfered with interstate commerce and that because the
Commerce Clause gave Congress the power to regulate interstate
commerce, Congress had the power to select a reasonable means to
eliminate this state interference. The reasonable means to eliminate the
state interference was section 2121(a) of the Tax Reform Act.
This case is interesting because it shares similarities with two
other taxation cases previously discussed, Maryland v. Louisiana and
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana. In all three of these cases, a tax was
imposed on the subject resource. In all three cases, the tax was equally
imposed on all persons or entities dealing in the resource. And in all
cases, the impact of the tax was significantly greater on consumers or
entities outside the taxing state, since most of the resource flowed out of
state. However, like the Maryland v. Louisiana case and unlike the Montana
case, a system of tax credits operated to offset the impact of the tax on
in-state consumers and entities. This lack of "evenhandedness" in the
application of the tax impermissibly burdened interstate commerce and
doomed the statutes' ability to survive the Court's Commerce Clause
analysis.
V. The Timber Resource
The timber resource has also been the subject of Commerce
Clause litigation. In the case of South-Central Timber Development, Inc.
v. Wunnicke, 74 the Supreme Court reviewed the validity of an Alaska
170. Id. at 146.
171. 441 U.S.at 147-48 (referring to 122 CONG. REC. 24,324-29 (1976)).
172. 441 U.S. at 150.

173. Id. n.7.
174. 467 U.S. 82 (1984).
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law which required that timber taken from State lands be processed in
the State. This case is important for its discussion of the market-participant exception to the operation of the Commerce Clause.
In 1980, the State's department of natural resources published a
notice of sale of approximately forty-nine million board feet of timber.
The notice of sale and the proposed contract provided that the sale would
take place pursuant to the provisions of Alaska Administrative Code,
section 76.130, which requires that the "primary manufacture" of the
lumber occur within the State of Alaska." The primary manufacture
requirement did not effect privately-owned or federally-owned timber.
The stated purposes of the requirement were four-fold: 1) protect existing
industries; 2) establish new industries; 3) derive revenue from State
timber resources; and 4) manage the State's forests on a sustained yield
basis. 176
The major method of complying with the requirement was to
"slab" the logs on at least one side, thus, converting them into "cants."
These cants were then sawed to a maximum thickness of twelve inches
or squared on four sides along their entire length. The South-Central
Timber Development logging company, which shipped its wood products
almost exclusively to Japan, sued to stop the State's sale of the timber on
the basis that the primary manufacture requirement violated the dormant
or negative implications of the Commerce Clause.
As with other Commerce Clause cases, the Court looked to the
practical implications of the State's requirement as well as the requirement's express terms. The Court discovered that, rather than being less
expensive, it was actually more costly for a company to process logs
within the State. The reasons for this were that the slabs of wood
removed from the logs to make the cants were valuable, but unsalable in
the Alaska market. In addition, the slabs alone were unsalable outside
Alaska since they could not be stored in water. As a result, the valuable
slabs were burned. This inefficient use of the timber actually made the
canted logs worth less than unprocessed logs.'" The State of Alaska
contended that, not only was the primary manufacture requirement not

175. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. II,§ 76.130 (repealed in 1982) provided in part:
(a) The Director may require that primary manufacture of logs, cordwood,
bolts or other similar products be accomplished within the State of Alaska.
(b) The term primary manufacture means manufacture which is first in
order of time or development. When used in relation to sawmilling, it
means
(1) the breakdown process wherein logs have been reduced in size.. to
the extent that the residual cants, slabs or planks can be processed by
resaw equipment ....
176. Id.
177. 467 US. at 86 n.5.
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a violation of the Commerce Clause, Congress had actually, albeit
implicitly, sanctioned the requirement. The State based this contention on
the fact that Congress had endorsed a primary manufacture requirement
on timber taken from federal land.
The Court began its analysis of Alaska's congressional authorization argument by reviewing the rules expressed in previous cases. It
recalled that the opinions in both Sporhase and New England Power noted
that there was no congressional intent to insulate state laws from
Commerce Clause invalidity unless such intent had been "expressly
stated."" However, the Court departed from attaching the significance
to the phrase "expressly stated," that it had attached to the term in
previous cases: "There is no talismanic significance to the phrase
'expressly stated,' however; it merely states one way of meeting the
requirement that for a state regulation to be removed from the reach of
the dormant Commerce Clause, congressional intent must be unmistakably
clear.""7 This apparent liberalization of the "express intent" requirement
observed in earlier cases allowed the Court to review the Alaska law
from a more policy-oriented approach, rather than reviewing only the
language of the federal law cited by the State. While this change in the
Court's analysis appears significant, the policy-oriented approach is little
more than a restatement of the "evenhanded" treatment requirement
mentioned by the Court in the Snead case and other earlier cases."s In
the South-Centralcase, the Court noted the reason for the policy approach:
[Wihen Congress acts, all segments of the country are represented, and there is significantly less danger that one state will
be in a position to exploit others ....A rule requiring a clear
expression of approval by Congress ensures that there is, in
fact, such a collective decision and reduces significantly the
risk that unrepresented interests will be adversely affected by
restraints on commerce.' 8'
Before a state may rely on a federal law to justify its own law or
regulation burdening interstate commerce, the Court must be satisfied
that there was a congressional or collective decision to allow the state to
impose such a law or regulation.
In a footnote, the Court explained that Alaska's primary
manufacture policy had substantial ramifications beyond the Nation's

178. See Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941, 960 (1982); New England Power Co. v. New
Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 341 (1982).
179. 467 U.S. at 91 (emphasis added).
180. Arizona Public Service Co. v. Snead, 441 U.S. 141, 150 (1979).
.181. 467 US. at 92.
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borders.,, The fact that much of the wood taken from Alaska's forests
was destined for Japan, led the Court to note that congressional
authorization of a state policy should not be lightly implied in such cases,
since the need for consistent and coherent foreign policy is the exclusive
responsibility of the federal government." The Court concluded this
phase of its analysis by rejecting Alaska's argument that, because
Congress had promulgated a primary manufacture policy respecting
federal lands, a parallel state policy was similarly authorized.'"
The Court then undertook the analysis of Alaska's claim that the
primary manufacture provision was valid on the basis of the state
"market-participant" exception to the Commerce Clause."8 ' This exception to the traditional Commerce Clause analysis provides that Commerce
Clause restrictions do not apply to a state which enters the market place
as a participant rather than as a regulator. The exception was based on
the premise that, "Nothing in the purposes animating the Commerce
Clause prohibits a State, in the absence of congressional action, from
participating in the market and exercising the right to favor its own
citizens over others."'
In Reeves, Inc. v. Stake," the Court had
noted: "[T]he Commerce Clause responds principally to state taxes and
regulatory measures impeding free private trade in the national market
place .... There is no indication of a constitutional plan to limit the
ability of the States themselves to operate freely in the free market."' '"
The Court also explained that the market participant exception to the
Commerce Clause was, "counseled by considerations of state sovereignty,
the role of each State 'as guardian and trustee for its people... and the
long recognized right of trader or manufacturer, engaged in an entirely
private business, freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to
parties with whom he will deal."' ' 89
With the Hughes and Reeves cases as precedent, the South-Central
Court interpreted these earlier rulings as recognizing "[Tihe principle that

182. Id. n.7.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 92-93.
185. Id. at 93. This exception, originated in the case of Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp.,
426 U.S. 794 (1976), and reiterated in Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980), was applied
in Commerce Clause cases involving subjects other than natural resources. In Reeves, the
majority suggested that, because cement was not a "natural resource" like coal, timber, wild
game or minerals, "hoarding" by a state posed fewer Commerce Clause concerns than the
hoarding of "natural resources." See 447 U.S. at 443-44. Justice Powell, in his dissent in
Reeves, questioned the validity of the reasons for such a distinction. Id. at 448-49 n.2.
186. 426 U.S. 794, 810 (1976) (footnotes omitted).
187. 447 U.S. 429 (1980).

188. 447 U.S. 429, 436-37 (1980).
189. Id. at 438-39 (footnotes and citations omitted).
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the Commerce Clause places no limitations on a State's refusal to deal
with particular parties when it is participating in the interstate market in
goods."" ° The Court noted that while the State of Maryland in Hughes
became a market-participant as the purchaser of scrap metal, Alaska
participated in the timber market by imposing "downstream" conditions
on the timber processing market. These "downstream" conditions, the
primary manufacture requirements, removed from the timber processors
the choice of the most economically advantageous location to process the
timber. The Court also noted that while Reeves' strongly endorsed the
right of a state to deal with whomever it chooses when it participates in
a market situation, the decision did not sanction the State's imposition of
any terms that it might desire. The South CentralCourt therefore limited
the application of the market-participant exception:
The limit of the market-participant doctrine must be that it
allows a State to impose burdens on [interstate] commerce
within the market in which it is a participant, but allows it to
go no further. The State may not impose conditions, whether
by statute, regulation, or contract, that have a substantial
regulatory effect outside of that particular market.19
In this context, the market must be narrowly defined if the market-participant exception is not to swallow up the general Commerce Clause rule
that States may not impose substantial burdens on interstate commerce.
The Court then concluded its market-participant analysis by
stating that the State may not avail itself of the market-participant
exemption to immunize its downstream regulation of the timber
processing industry, and by distinguishing South Central's scheme of
regulation from South Dakota's participation as the owner of a cement
plant in Reeves:
First, simply as a matter of intuition a state market participant
has a greater interest as a "private trader" in the immediate
transaction than it has in what its purchaser does with the
goods after the State no longer has an interest in them. The
common law recognized such a notion in the doctrine of
restraints on alienation .... Second, downstream restrictions
have a greater regulatory effect than do limitations on the
immediate transaction. 2
In essence, a state may avoid Commerce Clause invalidation of its actions
as a market-participant in direct transactions to which it is a party.
190. 467 U.S. at 94.
191. Id. at 97.
192. Id. at 98-99.
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However, the full force of the Commerce Clause applies where a state, as
a market-participant, attempts to impose restrictions on transactions in
which it is not a direct participant. In this sense, the market-participant
exception may be more appropriately termed the "transaction-participant"
exception.
The Court concluded its analysis of the case by giving short shrift
to the contention that the primary manufacture requirement did not
substantially burden interstate commerce. In holding that the requirement
constituted a substantial burden on interstate commerce, the Court
commented: "Because of the protectionist nature of Alaska's local-processing requirement and the burden on commerce resulting therefrom, we
conclude that it falls within the rule of virtual per se invalidity of laws
that 'bloc[k] the flow of interstate commerce at a State's borders."""
The Court felt supported in this ruling by an additional aspect of
Commerce Clause analyses: "It is a well-accepted rule that state restrictions burdening foreign commerce are subjected to a more rigorous and
searching scrutiny.,"19 Since the primary manufacture requirement
impacted timber trade with Japan, the more rigid form of scrutiny was
applied. As indicated, the South-Central decision would have been the
same, irrespective of the timber trade with Japan.
Akin to the case of Hickin v. Orbeck, insofar as it deals with
preserving for the state something other than the resource itself, is the
case of Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc." While this case did not deal with
the interstate commerce of a natural resource in the sense of coal, natural
gas or timber, its contribution to understanding of the Supreme Court's
recent Commerce Clause analysis cannot be understated. Indeed, the Pike
case and the doctrines it embodies are probably the most influential
forces in the Court's Commerce Clause analysis today.'"
The Pike case dealt only indirectly with the interstate transportation of cantaloupes grown in Arizona: the case dealt directly with
Arizona's requirement that cantaloupes grown in the State be packaged
in the State. The Arizona Fruit and Vegetable Standardization Act
required, with few exceptions, that all cantaloupes grown in Arizona and
offered for sale must 'be packed in regular compact arrangement in
dosed standard containers approved by the supervisor."' Citing this
provision as authority, the State of Arizona issued an order prohibiting
the appellee from transporting its Arizona-grown cantaloupes thirty-one

193. Id.at 100 (citations omitted).
194. Id.(emphasis added).
195. 397 US. 137 (1970). Cf. Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 US. 518 (1978).
196. See Hellerstein, supra note 137, at 65. Professor Hellerstein correctly argues that the
Pike analysis existed in some form in many of the Court's opinions prior to Pike.
197. 397 U.S. at 138 (quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3-503c (Supp. 1969)).
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miles to its packing facility located in Blythe, California, without first
packing them in accordance with the law. Of course, once the cantaloupes
reached Blythe, they were packed and then shipped to market. With the
Arizona law and the order issued pursuant to that law in effect, the
appellee faced the prospect of losing the entire 1968 crop and having to
construct packing facilities in Arizona in time for the next year's crop.
The appellee sued, arguing that the Arizona law and the subsequent
order constituted invalid burdens on interstate commerce.
The Court's analysis of the issue began with a statement of the
general rule as it applies to burdens on interstate commerce.
Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a
legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate
commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the
burden imposed on such commerce is dearly excessive in
relation to the putative local benefits. If a legitimate local
purpose is found, then the question becomes one of degree.
And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of
course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and
on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact
on interstate activities.1"
With this rule in mind, the Court noted that the purpose of the law was
to prevent growers from shipping inferior or deceptively packaged
produce which would result in tarnishing the reputation of the Arizona
growers and reducing their financial return accordingly. There was no
contemplation that the law had any other purpose than to protect
Arizona cantaloupe growers in this manner. While the Court recognized
the validity of the law with respect to cantaloupes which were packed in
Arizona, it recognized that the order issued by the State, pursuant to the
law, had the effect of requiring the appellee to enhance the reputation of
Arizona growers through the good will of the appellee's superior
produce.1" In other words, the State contended that it was Arizona's
legitimate interest to require that out-of-state cantaloupe purchasers be
informed that the appellee's high quality cantaloupes were grown in
Arizona .2W
The Court held that this tenuous interest could not constitutionally justify the loss of the appellee's 1968 cantaloupe crop nor the requirement that the appellee build and operate packing facilities in Arizona.
This holding comports with the general rule applied by the Court that the
burden on interstate commerce must not be clearly excessive in relation
198. Id.at 142. See also Arizona Public Service Co. v. Snead, 441 U.S. 141, 150 (1979).
199..397 US. at 144.
200. Id.
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to the local benefits or the interest of the State. This holding is further
supported by the Court's generally suspicious view of any statute or
regulation requiring business operations to be carried on within a given
state that could be more efficiently performed elsewhere.' Where such
is the effect of a state law the burden on commerce is per se illegal.m
VI. The Aquatic Resource
The general legal principles of the Pike case originated in the
earlier case of Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel.' This case, like
Pike, did not involve a natural resource in the sense of oil, gas or other
minerals, but rather shrimp. In Foster-Fountain,the complaining company
engaged in the business of catching and canning shrimp. In 1926, the
State of Louisiana passed the "Shrimp Act," declaring all shrimp in
Louisiana waters to be property of the State. The Act also declared
unlawful the exportation of shrimp from the State unless the head and
shell had first been removed.'
This law impacted severely on the
Foster Company since it caught the shrimp in Louisiana waters and
transported them directly to a canning and packing plant in Biloxi,
Mississippi. The law would have required the company to process the
shrimp in Louisiana before exporting them out of the state. Important to
the case was the fact that Louisiana had few shrimp processing plants,
while located at Biloxi was about one fourth of the entire shrimp canning
industry of the United States. In other words, it was economically more

201. Id. at 145. See also Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 US. 725, 754 (1981).

202. Id.
203. 278 U.S. 1 (1928).
204. Id. at 5-6. The Shrimp Act states in pertinent part:.
To declare all shrimp and parts thereof in the waters of the State to be the
property of the State of Louisiana, and to provide the manner and extent
of their reduction to private ownership; to encourage, protect, conserve,
regulate and develop the shrimp industry of the State of Louisiana ....
Section 1..... That all salt water shrimp existing in the waters of this
State, and the hulls and all parts of said salt water shrimp shall be and are
hereby declared to be property of the State... and that no person, firm or
corporation shall catch or have in their possession[, living or dead, any
salt water shrimp, or parts thereof, or purchase, sell, or offer for sale, any
such shrimp or parts thereof, after the same have been caught except as
otherwise permitted herein.
Section 13. All salt water shrimp and the shells or hulls and heads of all
salt water shrimp are hereby declared to be the property of the state and
the shells or hulls and heads to be valuable for use as a natural resource
of the state as a fertilizer in the state; and it shall therefore and hereafter
be unlawful to export from the [Sitate of Louisiana any salt water shrimp
from which the shell or hull and head shall not have been removed.
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efficient to transport the shrimp to Mississippi for processing than it was
to construct new processing facilities in Louisiana. The Court also noted
that fertilizers made from the hulls and heads of the shrimp were worth
less than one percent of the value of the shrimp. In essence, the purpose
of the Shrimp Act was to prevent the interstate movement of shrimp from
Louisiana to Mississippi, and to force the relocation of the canning and
packing industry from Mississippi to Louisiana.
The Court first noted that while the legislative declarations of the
purpose of the statute were important, the practical operation of a law
oft-times differed from the statements of purpose. The Court's concentration therefore, focused on the practical considerations and the established
courses of business.' The Court began by distinguishing this case from
the earlier case of Geer v. Connecticut' in which the Court upheld the
validity of a state regulation on a theory of public ownership. In Geer, the
issue involved a law which regulated the killing of quail for transportation beyond the limits of the state. To the Court, the Louisiana Shrimp
Act differed from the Geer statute in that most all of the shrimp caught
in Louisiana waters were bound for places outside the State; no conservation for in-state use of the shrimp was contemplated.' As a result, the
Court reasoned that the State had released any hold it may have had on
the shrimp; the protection of the Commerce Clause thus attached to the
shrimp at the time of taking.20 It is within this context that the Pike
Court derived the rule that, where the purpose of a state statute is to
require the performance of a commercial activity in the state which could
be more economically and efficiently performed elsewhere, it is a per se
violation of the Commerce Clause. It must be remembered that in
discerning a statute's purpose, the practical operation of the law
supersedes any legislative pronouncement of purpose.
The case of Idaho v. Oregon'0 reviewed Idaho's claim for an
equitable apportionment of the anadromous fish21 in the Columbia-Snake River system2 t Before 1938, the long and difficult journey

205. 278 U.S. at 10.
206. 161 U.S. 519 (1896), overruled by Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
207. 278 U.S. at 12-13.
208. Id. at 13.
209. 462 US. 1017 (1983).
210. Anadromous fish are those which migrate from the sea up fresh water rivers to
spawn, i.e., chinook salmon and steelhead trout.
211. Eventhough fish hatcheries were established in an attempt to augment, maintain or
enhance the fish runs, the locations of these hatcheries "yielded unacceptable distributive
consequences, depriving treaty Indians, upriver sportsmen, and Idahoans of much of the
runs upon which they historically depended." Michael C. Blumm, Fulfilling the Parity
Promise:A Perspectiveon ScientificProof,Economic Cost, and Indian Treaty Rights in the Approval
of the Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Program,13 ENVTL. L. 103, 111 (1982).
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facing the salmon and trout from the Pacific Ocean to the freshwater
spawning areas was relatively unencumbered by man-made structures.
However, since 1938, this journey was significantly complicated by the
construction of hydroelectric dams on the Columbia and Snake Rivers. 21 2 The turbines, through which the river waters flowed to generate
the electricity, killed most if not all fish life.213
As part of the dam construction, some of these hydroelectric
facilities had constructed fish ladders or other structures allowing the fish
to detour around the turbines. However, the dams in general have
reduced the number of migrating adults reaching spawning areas and
have similarly reduced the number of young fish migrating down the
river to the ocean.2 14 Other factors, including the harvesting of these
fish in the States of Washington and Oregon pursuant to the 1918
Oregon-Washington Columbia River Fish Compact also caused a further
reduction in the numbers of fish in the river system.215
Idaho had unsuccessfully sought entry into the Compact which
divided the lower Columbia River into six fishing zones. Each year,
authorities in the Compact-member states estimated the size of the fish
migration or "run" and determined the length of the fishing season in

Professor Blumm notes that in passing the Pacific Northwest Electric Power
Planning and Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 839-39h (Supp. IV 1980), "Congress responded
to past failures... directing that long overdue fish and wildlife protection and compensation be designed to benefit those who had lost the most: the upriver users." Blumm, supra
at 111-12.
Section 4(a) of the Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation
Act established an eight-member council to oversee the Act's implementation. The council
is composed of two gubernatorial appointees from each of four states: Idaho, Montana, Oregon and Washington.
212. As presently constituted, the Federal Columbia River Power System consists of 28
dams. See Michael C. Blumm, Implementing the ParityPromise: An Evaluationof the Columbia
Basin Fish and Wildlife Program, 14 ENVTL. L 277, 278 n.3 (1984).
213. "Fish migrating through the Columbia and Snake River system must surmount as
many as nine dams to reach the ocean or return to their spawning grounds. (footnote
omitted). An average of fifteen percent of the juvenile and up to twenty percent of the adult
fish are destroyed at each dam they attempt to pass." Michael C. Blumm, Promisinga Process
for Parity: The Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planningand Conservation Act and Anadromous
Fish Protection, 11 ENVTL. L. 497, 501-02 (1982).

214. "[Dlams have contributed materially to a two-thirds decline in the Columbia's
commercial salmon catch, imperiling the exercise of Indian treaty rights, and extinguishing
some fish runs altogether." Blumm, supra note 212, at 279.
215. "[Allthough a variety of factors have contributed to the decline of the fish
runs-including logging, irrigation, and overfishing-the principal adverse effects are attributable to the construction and operation of dams." Blumm, supranote 211, at 106 n.8 (citing
U.S. Comptroller Gen., Impacts and Implications of the Pacific Northwest Power Bill 20
(EMD-79-105, Sept. 4, 1979)).
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each zone. Since 1973, fish and wildlife managers had noticed that the
runs had been significantly smaller.21
In reviewing Idaho's claim for an equitable apportionment of
these fish, the Court noted at the outset that" the Special Master correctly
concluded that the doctrine of equitable apportionment [was] applicable
to this dispute. Although that doctrine has its roots in water rights
litigation .. .the natural resource of anadromous fish is sufficiently
similar to make equitable apportionment an appropriate mechanism for
resolving allocative disputes."2 7 This conclusion was the result of
reasoning that, as with water, the fish at issue travel through several
states during their spawning runs and migrations back to the ocean. Also,
as ina water-rights dispute, what one downstream state does with the
fish on their way upstream has much to do with the numbers of fish
reaching the upstream state.
The Court noted that the doctrine of equitable apportionment is
not dependent upon or bounded by the parties' legal rights to the
resource involved in the dispute. Rather, while the legal rights are an
important factor, they must often give way to broader equitable
considerations. The root of this doctrine, the Court held, is also the root
of many Commerce Clause cases: "[A] State may not preserve solely for
its own inhabitants natural resources located within its borders. "2 8 The
Court then stated, "[clonsistent with this principle, States have an
affirmative duty under the doctrine of equitable apportionment to take
reasonable steps to conserve and even to augment the natural resources
within their borders for the benefit of the other states."219 While the
Court concluded, according to these principles, that Idaho had an

216. "[C]olumbia Basin dams have reduced accessible anadromous fish spawning habitat
by more than one-half. The dams have contributed materially to a two-thirds decline in the
Columbia's commercial salmon catch, imperiling the exercise of Indian treaty rights, and
extinguishing some fish runs altogether." Blunm, supra note 212, at 278-79 (citations
omitted).
"Inyears of low river flow, juvenile mortalities at each project can reach forty-five
percent, with a ninety-five percent total mortality for all downstream migrants." Blumm,
supra note 213, at 502 n.22.
217. 462 U.S. at 1024. The Court quoted from a portion of its opinion in Kansas v.
Colorado, 206 US. 46, 98 (1907), to explain the doctrine of equitable apportionment:
[Whenever ... the action of one State'reaches through the agency of
natural laws into the territory of another State, the question of the extent
and the limitations of the rights of the two States becomes a matter of
justiciable dispute between them, and this Court is called upon to settle
that dispute in such a way as will recognize the equal rights of both and
at the same time establish justice between them.
Id. n.8.
218. 462 US. at 1025.
219. Id.
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equitable right to a fair distribution to the fish resource, it held that Idaho
had not demonstrated sufficient injury to justify an equitable decree.
The Idaho case is interesting for its amalgamation of equitable
apportionment principles with the traditional principles governing
Commerce Clause cases. What is particularly interesting is the Court's
mention that in equitable apportionment cases, States have an affirmative
duty to augment the resources within their borders for the benefit of
other States.' z The Court gives no further clue to the possible application of this statement to other Commerce Clause cases. However, the
question arises: may a resource-dependent state sue another state for
what it perceives to be the mismanagement of the resource located in that
state? Would this statement apply to a resource that in its natural form,
lies wholly within a single state? While these questions are probably
answered in the negative, they involve important principles of State's
rights and sovereignty, and have the potential of allowing future cases to
expand the reach of the Commerce Clause.
The case of Hughes v. Oklahoma' also dealt with a fish
resource. Unlike the Idaho case, the Hughes case is based exclusively on
Commerce Clause analysis. The subject of the case was an Oklahoma
statute which stated in part that:
A. No person may ship or transport minnows for sale into this
state from an outside source without having first procured a
license for such from the Director.
B. No person may transport or ship minnows for sale outside
the state which were seined or procured with-in the waters of
this state ....
The purpose of this law was to protect against the depletion of
minnows in the natural streams of the State through commercial
exploitation. Nothing in the law prohibited commercial minnow

220. Id. In the case of Indian treaty rights, Professor Blumm states that: "[The States]
cannot regulate harvest management to deprive the tribes of a fair share of the resource."
Blumm, supranote 211, at 140 (citing Washington v. Washington State Fishing Vessel Ass'n,
443 U.S. 658 (1979)). "The state can regulate the tribes' share only where necessary for
conservation of the resource." Id. n.164 (citing Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game, 391
U.S. 392, reh'g denied, 393 U.S. 898 (1968); Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game, 444 U.S.
441 (1973)).
221. 441 U.S. 322 (1979). For a detailed examination of the case and its significance, see
Hellerstein, supra note 137. Professor Hellerstein noted that Hughes may well have been
wrongly decided since, as he pointed out in footnote 20, existing federal law precluded the
transportation of fish in interstate where the transportation was prohibited by state law. Id.
at 55 n.20.
222. 441 U.S. at 323 n.1 (quoting OKLA. STAT. tit. 29, §§ 4-115 (Supp. 1978).
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hatcheries from selling stock minnows to anyone or from exporting stock
minnows to customers outside the State.
After recognizing the negative or dormant aspect of the Commerce Clause," which invalidates state laws burdening interstate
commerce even in the absence of congressional action in the same field
of regulation, the Court overruled the ability of a state to regulate the
interstate commerce of its natural resources based on the theory of public
The Court then
ownership enunciated in Geer v. Connecticut.'
proceeded to apply the rule of the Pike' case to invalidate the Oklahoma statute. Noting that the Oklahoma statute discriminated on its face
against interstate commerce, the Court stated that "such facial discrimination by itself may be a fatal defect, regardless of the State's purpose,
because 'the evil of protectionism can reside in legislative means as well
as legislative ends.'"' Where this facial discrimination does not of itself
invalidate the subject statute, "[alt a minimum such facial discrimination
invokes the strictest scrutiny of any purported legitimate local purpose
and of the absence of nondiscriminatory alternatives. " ' While the
Court considered the State's interest in the conservation and protection
of wild animals a legitimate local purpose similar to the State's interest
in protecting the health and safety of its citizens, it also considered the
State's method of conservation to be the most overtly discriminatory
method.'
Had the State placed limits on the numbers of minnows
taken by licensed dealers and on how the minnows might be disposed of
within the State, a better case may have been made for upholding the
statute.? The State was not left powerless by the Court to protect and
conserve the wildlife within its borders. The Court stated vaguely that
States may conserve and protect their wildlife only in ways "consistent
with the basic principles that 'our economic unit is the Nation.'"2 The
Court further stated that "when a wild animal 'becomes an article of

223. See Skillern, supra note 28 and accompanying text.
224. 441 US. at 326-29.
225. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
226. 441 U.S. at 338 (quoting Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626 (1978)).
227. 441 US. at 337.
228. Id. at 337-38. "While the Commerce Clause does not require the States to fine tune
their legislation to minimize any conceivable impact it might have on interstate commerce,
Oklahoma's effort to conserve its minnows reflected, at best, an unjustifiable indifference
to such impact." Hellerstein, supra note 137, at 60.
229. 441 U.S. at 338 (quoting H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949))
230. Id. at 339. As Professor Hellerstein puts it: 'The critical analytical problem, therefore,
is to determine how the accommodation between competing demands of national economic
unity and legitimate state policy is reached." Hellerstein, supra note 137, at 63.
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commerce... its use cannot be limited to the citizens of one state to the
exclusion of citizens of another state."' 1
Minnows were also the subject of the case of Maine v. Taylor. 2
In this case, the Court reviewed the constitutionality of a state law which
prohibited the importation of live baitfish into the State of Maine. 23 In
spite of the statute, Taylor arranged for the delivery of 158,000 live
golden shiner minnows from outside the State.' The shipment was
intercepted and Taylor was indicted for violating the Lacy Act Amendments of 1981, which made it a federal crime "to import, export,
transport, sell, receive, acquire or purchase in interstate or foreign
commerce... any fish or wildlife taken, possessed, transported, or sold
in violation of any law or regulation of any State or in violation of any
foreign law. "2' Taylor defended against the indictment claiming that
the Maine law banning the importation of the minnows was unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause.
At the outset, the Court recognized that Maine's statute restricted
interstate trade in the most direct manner possible,' and that since the
import ban discriminated on its face against interstate trade, it was
subject to the strict scrutiny review of Hughes v. Oklahoma.'? After
dismissing the State's claim that the Lacy Act Amendments constituted
Congress' "unmistakably clear" intent to exempt the ban from the
limitations of the Commerce Clause,' the Court stated that the statute
was constitutional only if it satisfied the "requirements ordinarily applied
under Hughes v. Oklahoma to a local regulation that discriminates against
interstate trade: the statute must serve a legitimate local purpose, and the
purpose must be one that cannot be served as well by available nondiscriminatory means."' 0 Pursuant to this test, the Court reviewed the
evidence adduced during the evidentiary hearing in the district court and
noted that prosecution experts testified that live baitfish imported into the
State posed two threats to the State's "unique and fragile fisheries."'""
First, Maine's population of wild fish would be placed at risk by three

231. Id. (quoting Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 538 (1896)).
232. 477 U.S. 131 (1986).
233. Id. at 132 n.l: "A person is guilty of importing live bait if he imports into this State
any live fish, including smelts, which are commonly used for bait fishing in inland waters."
ML REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 7613 (West 1981).
234. 477 U.S. at 132.
235. Id. (quoting the Lacey Act Amendments of 1981, 95 Stat. 1073 (codified at 16 U.S.C.
3371-78)).
236. 477 U.S. at 137.
237. See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
238. 477 U.S. at 139.
239. Id. at 140.
240. Id. at 140-41.
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types of parasites found in out-of-state baitfish but not common to
Second, non-native species inadvertently
Maine's wild fisheries.24'
included in baitfish shipments could unpredictably disturb Maine's
aquatic ecology and environment by competing with native fish for food
The prosecution's experts further
and preying on native species.'
testified that inspection for commingled species and testing for the
presence of parasites in these species was practically impossible because
of the large quantities of baitfish shipped and the fact that necessary
scientific sampling techniques had not yet been developed for these
species.' Based on this testimony, the district court concluded that the
State had met the burden imposed by the Hughes case, finding that
because of the substantial uncertainty surrounding the effects that
imported baitfish parasites would have on indigenous species and the
unpredictable effects resulting from the introduction of nonnative species
into a unique fishery, Maine clearly had a legitimate and substantial
purpose in prohibiting the importation of live baitfish.' The district
court also found that less discriminatory means of protecting against
In light of the findings of
these threats were currently unavailable.'
"clearly erroneous,""46 the
not
to
be
the district court, which were held
Court held that "Maine has a legitimate interest in guarding against
imperfectly understood environmental risks, despite the possibility that
they may ultimately prove to be negligible."24' After finding the little
evidence of protectionist intent behind the enactment of the importation
ban to be unpersuasive,' the Court stated: "As long as a State does not
needlessly obstruct interstate trade or attempt to 'place itself in a position
of economic isolation,' ... it retains broad regulatory authority to protect
the health and safety of its citizens and the integrity of its natural
resources."249 The Court then held that the district court's findings
supported the conclusion that the importation ban served a legitimate
local purpose that could not adequately be served by available nondiscriminatory alternatives.' The Court concluded by noting that this was
not "a case of arbitrary discrimination against interstate commerce; the

241. Id. at 141.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 141-42.
244. Id. at 142 (citing U.S. v. Taylor, 595 F. Supp. 393, 397 (D. Me. 1984)).
245. Id. at 143 (citing Taylor, 585 F. Supp. at 398).
246. Id. at 145-46 (referring to the application of the "clearly erroneous" standard of
review to non-guilt findings of fact by district courts) (citing Campbell v. United States, 373
U.S. 487, 493 (1963); 2 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 374 (2d ed. 1982)).
247. Id. at 148.
248. Id. at 148-50.
249. Id. at 151.
250. Id.
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record suggests that Maine has legitimate reasons, 'apart from their
origin, to treat [out-of-state baitfish] differently,. .. .",2' As the lone
dissenter, Justice Stevens concluded that the State's evidence was simply
insufficient to overcome the burden and level of scrutiny established by
the Hughes decision.' 2
While the decision in Maine is rather straight-forward, it does
appear as though the Court was more deferential to the findings of the
district court than it had been in past cases. Whether this is explained by
a view that the parasites and unknown environmental consequences
mentioned in this case appear to be more akin to the "quarantine" cases
is not known. It is clear that the Court felt constrained to limit its analysis
to the facts adduced at the evidentiary hearing and to the weight
attributed to those facts by the district court. Nevertheless, it is striking
that the Court did not require more evidence on the potential environmental effects of allowing the importation of baitfish in order to qualify
the legitimate local purpose aspect of the Hughes test.
VII.

The Land Resource

Slightly different from the previously discussed cases is the case
of City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey.'
Rather than attempting to
protect and conserve a profitable resource found in abundance, New
Jersey attempted to protect and conserve a resource it has little of, open,
undeveloped land. New Jersey enacted a law which stated in pertinent
part:
No person shall bring into this State any solid or liquid waste
which originated or was collected outside the territorial limits
of the State, except garbage to be fed to swine in the State of
New Jersey, until the commissioner [of the State Department
of Environmental Protection] shall determine that such action
can be permitted without endangering the public health, safety
and welfare and has promulgated regulations permitting and
regulating the treatment and disposal of such waste in this
State.3
Acting under the authority conferred upon him by this statute, the
Commissioner promulgated regulations allowing only four categories of

251.
252.
253.
254.

Id. at 151-52 (citing Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 627 (1978)).
477 U.S. at 152-53.
437 U.S. 617 (1978).
Id. at 618-19 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1-10 (West Supp. 1978)).
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waste to enter the State.' This action effectively closed New Jersey's
borders to waste from other states.
After holding that the newly enacted Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA) did not preempt New Jerseys ability to regulate
wastes in the manner required by the State's laws, the Court began its
Commerce Clause analysis. The Court disagreed first with the New Jersey
Supreme Court's ruling that the subjects of the State law, wastes of
various sorts, were not articles in commerce and thus, not subject to the
provisions of the Commerce Clause. The state court had relied on earlier
U.S. Supreme Court opinions which had held that some objects are not
legitimate subjects of trade or commerce where, because of their existing
condition, they:
[Wiould bring in and spread disease, pestilence, and death,
such as rags or other substances infected with germs of yellow
fever or the virus of small pox, or cattle or meat or other
provisions that are diseased or decayed, or otherwise, from
their condition and quality unfit for human use or consumption.2
The Court distinguished such objects from the facts and issues presented
by the instant case:
All objects of interstate trade merit Commerce Clause protection; none is excluded by definition at the outset. In Bowman
and similar cases, the Court held simply that because the
articles' worth in interstate commerce was far outweighed by
the dangers inhering in their very movement, States could
prohibit their transportation across state lines. Hence, we reject
the state court's suggestion that the banning of "valueless"

255. These four categories were as folows:
1. Garbage to be fed to swine in the State of New Jersey;
2. Any separated waste material, including newsprint, paper, glass and
metals, that is free from putrescible materials and not mixed with other
solid of liquid waste that is intended for a recycling or reclamation facility;
3. Municipal solid waste to be separated or processed into usable
secondary materials, including fuel and heat, at a resource recovery facility
provided not less than 70 per cent of the throughput of any such facility
is to be separated or processed into usable secondary materials; and
4. Pesticides, hazardous waste, chemical waste, bulk liquid, bulk seni-liquid, which is to be treated, processed or recovered in a solid waste disposal
facility which is registered with the Department for such treatment,
processing or recovery, other than by disposal on or in the lands of this
State.
437 U.S. at 619-20 n.2 (quoting NJ. ADM. CODE tit. 7, §§ 1-4.2 (Supp. 1977)).
256. 437 U.S. at 622 (quoting Bowman v. Chicago & Northwestern R. Co., 125 U.S. 465,
489 (1888)).
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out-of-state wastes... implicates no constitutional protec-

tion.
The Court then noted that the dormant power of the Commerce Clause
prohibited state regulation of interstate commerce even though Congress
had not acted legislatively in the area of the state regulation.
In reviewing the purpose of the New Jersey statute, the Court
recognized that whatever its designated purpose, it could not be
accomplished by discriminating against articles of commerce coming from
outside the State, unless there was some reason, apart from their origin,
to treat them differently.2 The Court held that the statute, on its face,
imposed the entire burden of conserving the State's remaining landfill
space upon out-of-state commercial interests.25 While this language is
reminiscent of the rule that state actions amounting to economic
protectionism are per se invalid,71 the Court stopped short of so
designating the New Jersey statute. However, the Court noted that
protectionism is generally suspect even though the article in commerce
and the resource sought to be protected are distinct: "It is true that in our
previous cases the scarce natural resource was itself the article of
commerce, whereas here the scarce resource and the article in commerce
are distinct. But the difference is without consequence. 261 The crucial
element was the State's attempt to isolate itself from a problem by
erecting a barrier or burdening interstate commerce. 2
The Court distinguished New Jersey's statute from quarantine
laws which are generally recognized as valid measures to protect the
health and safety of the citizens of a state. Since the New Jersey statute
banned only the movement of potentially noxious materials into the State
from other states, and not the movement of such materials within the
State, it could not have been given more favorable treatment.' Moreover, unlike quarantine laws, there was no claim that the very movement
of the wastes across the state lines endangered public health. The only
danger posed by the wastes occurred after they were deposited in a
landfill, and once there, they were as dangerous as the wastes generated
within New Jersey. In this regard, a demonstration of danger resulting
from the transportation of the waste may have assisted New Jersey's case.
However, given the disposition of the next case in this discussion, such

257. 437 U.S. at 622.
258. Id. at 626-27. See also Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978).
259. 437 US. at 628.
260. See New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331 (1982); South-Central
Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397
U.S. 137 (1970); Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1 (1928).
261. 437 U.S. at 628.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 628-29.
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a demonstration would probably have done little to effect the ultimate
outcome of the case.
The case of Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt2" is a
more recent Commerce Clause case. On April 17,1990, Governor Guy
Hunt of the State of Alabama signed into law Alabama Act No. 90-326
(Act). This Act, effective on July 15, 1990, imposed a fee of $72.00 per ton
on all hazardous waste generated outside the State deposited in a
commercial facility in Alabama (Additional Fee).20 The Act also
imposed a base fee of $25.60 per ton on all waste disposed of at a
commercial hazardous waste facility, regardless of the origin of the waste
(Base Fee).2' Finally, the Act imposed a limit or cap on the annual
amount of waste disposed of at any commercial facility handling more
than 100,000 tons of waste annually (Cap). 7 The Cap limited the
amount of waste deposited at such commercial facilities to the amount
deposited between July 15,1990, and July 14,1991, the first year in which
the Base Fee and Additional Fee became effective. 2
This new law and its attendant fees were of particular concern to
Chemical Waste Management, Inc. (CWM), since it operated the only
commercial facility handling more than 100,000 tons of waste annually in
the entire State of Alabama.' The CWM facility, located at Emelle,
Alabama (Emelle facility), was the only commercial hazardous waste

264. 584 So.2d 1367 (Ala. 1991), cert. granted, 502 U.S. 1070 (1992) (certiorari was granted
only as to Question I presented by the petition: "Whether a $72 per ton disposal tax that on
its face applies only to waste generated outside of Alabama violates the Commerce Clause.")
265. "For waste and substances which are generated outside of Alabama and disposed
of at commercial site for the disposal of hazardous waste or hazardous substances in
Alabama, an additional fee shall be levied at the rate of $72.00 per ton." ALA. CODE §
22-30B-2(b) (1975).
266. "In addition to other fees levied, there is hereby levied a fee to be paid by the
operators of each commercial site for the disposal of hazardous waste or hazardous
substances in the amount of $25.60 per ton for all waste or substances disposed of at such
site." ALA. CODE § 22-30B-2(a) (1975).
267. Any commercial site for the disposal of hazardous waste or hazardous substances
that disposes of in excess of 1,000,000 tons of hazardous waste or hazardous substances
during the twelve-month period beginning July 15, 1990, and ending July 14, 1991,
(hereinafter referred [to] as the benchmark period) shall not, during any twelve-month
period beginning October 1,1991, and any twelve-month period thereafter, dispose of more
than the tonnage received during said benchmark period.... [pirovided, however, that the
governor or the governor's designee may allow disposal of hazardous wastes or hazardous
substances in excess of the tonnage disposed of during the benchmark period if such action
is determined by the governor or the governor's designee to be necessary to protect human
health or the environment in the state, or to allow the state to comply with its obligations
to assure disposal capacity pursuant to applicable state or federal law as determined by the
governor or his designee. ALA. CODE § 22-30B-23.
268. Id.
269. 'The Cap provision applies only to commercial facilities that dispose of over 100,000
tons of waste per year. The facility at Emelle, Alabama, is the only facility in this category."
Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 584 So.2d 1367, 1369 (Ala. 1991).
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landfill facility operating in the State' and one of only eight facilities
in the United States that holds the appropriate permits to accept and
dispose of polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs).'
The trial court found, among other things, that increasing
amounts of out-of-state hazardous wastes were being shipped to the
Emelle facility.'m In fact, in 1989, 788,000 tons of waste had been
deposited at Emelle, of which only 8.6 percent was generated in-state.27
In other words, approximately 40,000 truckloads of waste were deposited
at Emelle in 1989, of which 34,000 to 36,000 came from out-of-state. 4
Two years prior to filing suit, Emelle had received approximately
seventeen percent of all hazardous wastes commercially landfilled in the
United States.2' 5
The Court took note of the findings of the state legislature
justifying the passage of the Act, among which was the opinion that
"[tihe state is increasingly becoming the nation's final burial ground for
the disposal of hazardous wastes and materials." '6 While these facts
and circumstances formed the basis of the lawsuit, the controversy
actually began three years earlier.
On April 8, 1988, CWM was declared the lowest bidder and as
a result, obtained the contract to dispose of wastes contaminated with
PCBs from a Superfund site77 located in South Houston, Texas, at the
Emelle facility.' In an attempt to prevent the transportation of those
wastes into Alabama for disposal at Emelle, the Governor, the State
Attorney General and the head of the State's department of environmental management filed suit as private citizens against the Environmental
Protection Agency' (EPA).

270. 'The Emelle facility isthe only commercial hazardous waste landfill facility currently
in operation in the State of Alabama." Chemical Waste Management, 584 So.2d at 1372.
271. Brief for Petitioner at 7 n.6, Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 502 U.S. 1070
(1992) (No. 91-471).
272. "The following tonnage has been received by Emelle in the years indicated:
1985 .............................. 341,000 tons
1986 .............................. 456,000 tons
1987 ............
564,000 tons
1988 ............
549,000 tons
1989 .............................. 788,000 tons."
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 57a, app. B, Chemical Waste Management, 502 U.S. 1070
(1992) (No. 91-471).
273. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 63a, app. B, Chemical Waste Management, 502 U.S.

1070 (1992).

274. Id. at 62a.
275. Id. at 58a.
276. Id. at 52a (quoting Act No. 90-326 § 1, Code § 22-30B-1.1).
277. The phrase, "Superfund site," refers to a hazardous waste site listed on the National
Priorities List pursuant to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §9601 et seq.
278. Alabama v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, 871 F.2d 1548, 1553
(l1th Cir. 1989).
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The plaintiffs claimed that they were entitled to notice and an
opportunity to express their views regarding the appropriate remedial
action for the South Houston site. n The district court granted the
requested preliminary injunction and motion for partial summary
judgment ordering EPA to reopen its Record of Decision specifying the
type of remediation activity for the site. 0
On appeal to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, the court
held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the remediation plan
and failed to establish a causal connection between the alleged injury to
Alabama's environment and the lack of notice and opportunity to
participate in the selection of the remedial action.' The court also held
that CERCLA prevented judicial review of remedial actions until all
actions in the Record of Decision had been completed.'
Undaunted by this defeat, on May 11, 1989, the Alabama
legislature enacted Act No. 89-788, known as the "Holley Bill." This law
banned the importation of hazardous waste generated in states which had
laws prohibiting the treatment of disposal of such wastes and which had
no hazardous waste treatment facility, or which had no facility for the
treatment or disposal of such wastes and had not entered into an
interstate or regional waste disposal agreement to which Alabama was a
Shortly after enactment of the Holley Bill, the National
signatory.'
Solid Wastes Management Association and CWM filed suit alleging that
In a
the Bill unconstitutionally burdened interstate commerce.'
memorandum opinion, the trial court upheld the constitutionality of the

279. Id. at 1554.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 1555-56.
282. Id. at 1557-58.
283. National Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n v. Dep't of Envtl. Mgmt., 729 F. Supp. 792, 797
(N.D. Ala. 1990).
It is unlawful for any person who owns or operates a commercial hazardous waste treatment or disposal facility within this state to dispose or treat
any hazardous wastes generated in any state outside the State of Alabama
which:
(i) prohibits by law or regulation the treatment or disposal of hazardous
wastes within that state and which has no facility permitted or existing
within that state for the treatment or disposal of hazardous wastes; or
(ii) has no facility permitted or existing within that state for the treatment
or disposal of hazardous wastes; unless that state has entered into an
interstate or regional agreement for the safe disposal of hazardous wastes
pursuant to the federal Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act.
Id. at 799 (quoting Holley Bill § 2, Act No. 89-788 (to amend ALA. CODE § 22-30-11(b)
(1975))).
284. National Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n v. Alabama Dep't of Envtl. Mgmt., 729 F. Supp.
at 793.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol 35

Holley Bill since the law was directed at legitimate state interests,
compliance with the twenty-year CERCLA capacity assurance directive
and the assurance that hazardous waste buried in the state was disposed
of in the most environmentally protective manner. The trial court also
held that the statute did not close the state's borders to all out-of-state
waste.' In addition, the court noted that the statute was not sufficiently discriminatory against out-of-state economic interests, nor was it an
attempt to preserve a natural resource, landfill capacity, at the expense
of the nation so as to require the statute's constitutional demise.'
On appeal, the appeals court vacated the judgment of the trial
court and remanded the case, holding that hazardous waste was an
article in commerce and that the Holley Bill erected an unconstitutional
barrier to the interstate movement of those wastes.28' In so holding, the
appeals court expressly relied on the analysis of the City of Philadelphia
case and as a result, concluded that the Holley Bill was a "protectionist
measure not based adequately on a legitimate local concern ....
20
In support of this conclusion, the Court noted that the Holley Bill was not
a requirement for Alabama's compliance with the requirements of
CERCLA §104(c)(9).
Moreover, while the Alabama legislature found
large volumes of hazardous waste to be entering the State, increasing the
possibility of accidents and risk to citizens and the environment, the
Holley Bill banned only those shipments from certain states.'
The appeals court also noted that, since the Bill did not distinguish "on the basis of type of waste or degree of danger, but on the basis
of the state of generation," it did not qualify as a "quarantine" law and

285. Id. at 804.
286. Id.
287. National Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n v. Alabama Dep't of Envtl. Mgmt., 910 F.2d at
718.
288. Id. at 720. The court specifically stated that because the law was a protectionist
measure not based adequately on a legitimate local concern, it was error for the district
court to have applied the balancing test of Pike. Id.
289. CERCLA § 104(c)(9). This provision states, in part:
[T]he President shall not provide any remedial actions pursuant to this
section unless the State in which the release occurs first enters into a
contract or cooperative agreement... providing assurances deemed adequate by the President that the State will assure the availability of hazardous waste treatment or disposal facilities which
(A) have adequate capacity for the destruction, treatment, or secure
disposition of all hazardous wastes that are reasonably expected to be
generated within the State during the next 20-year period following the
date of such contract or cooperative agreement ....
Id.
290. 910 F.2d at 720.
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for exemption from the operation of Commerce Clause
"was ineligible
291
prohibitions."
The declaration that the Holley Bill was unconstitutional resulted
in the enactment of the law which is the subject of the Court's latest
Commerce Clause ruling. In its petition for certiorari filed on September
20, 1991, CWM asked the Court to consider the constitutionality of all
three aspects of the Alabama Act: the Additional Fee, the Base Fee, and
the Cap. However, the Court granted the petition to consider only the
constitutionality of the Additional Fee. Oral arguments in the case
were presented on April 21,1992, and on June 1,1992, the Court held the
Additional Fee to be unconstitutionaL.'
The Court's analysis began with the observation that "[n]o State
may attempt to isolate itself from a problem common to the several States
by raising barriers to the free flow of interstate trade," and then
followed its decision in the Philadelphia v. New Jersey case. The Court
held that the Additional Fee facially and in practical effect discriminated
against hazardous waste generated in states other than Alabama, and
therefore, the burden fell upon Alabama to justify the unavailability of
nondiscriminatory alternatives adequate to preserve the local interests at
stake." 5 Noting that such facial discrimination required the invocation

291. Id. at 721.
292. 502 U.S. 1070 (1992). Obviously, the Court could have granted the petition as to all
three questions presented, in light of the fact that the Cap and Base fee provisions had a
direct and in practice, primary effect on interstate commerce. However, presumably because
the Base Fee and the Cap applied to all waste, irrespective of its point of origin, the Court
found no need for further Commerce Clause analysis. See the discussion of Maryland v.
Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725 (1981); Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, reh'g
denied, 453 U.S. 927 (1980).
293. Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 112 S. Ct. 2009 (1992).
294. 112 S. Ct. at 2012. In the case of Public Service Co. of Colorado v. Idaho, 33 Env't
Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1477 (D. Idaho. 1991), the Governor of Idaho sought to prevent shipments
of spent nuclear fuel from the Fort St. Vrain nuclear reactor located near Denver, Colorado
to a special storage facility at the Idaho Nuclear Engineering Laboratory near Idaho Falls,
Idaho. The United States, on behalf of the Department of Energy, filed suit to enjoin the
Governor from taking any steps to prevent the shipments from entering the State of Idaho.
In a brief opinion granting summary judgment in favor of the United States, the district
court noted that the Governor completely failed to address the merits of the United States'
motion for summary judgment and essentially conceded that he had no legal authority of
justify his attempts to stop the shipments. Id. at 1478. In light of the Governor's failure to
address the merits of the United States' motion for summary judgment, including an
analysis of Commerce Clause and Supremacy Clause case precedent, the court stated that
the parochial attempts by the Governor to prevent the shipments from entering Idaho were
of the type the Commerce Clause and the Supremacy Clause were designed to prevent. Id.
at 1479.
295. 112 S. Ct. at 2014 (quoting Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S.
333, 353 (1977)).
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of the strictest scrutiny since, the Additional Fee targets only out-of-state
hazardous waste, the Court went on to determine that the State had not
met its burden:
In the face of such findings, invalidity under the Commerce
Clause necessarily follows, for "whatever [Alabama's] ultimate
purpose, it may not be accomplished by discriminating against
articles of commerce coming from outside the State unless
there is some reason, apart from their origin, to treat them
differently." . ... The burden is on the State to show that "the
discrimination is demonstrably justified by a valid factor
unrelated to economic protectionism," . ., and it has not
carried this burden.2 "
It was obvious to the Court that while the State's concern focused
on the volume of waste entering the Emelle facility, less discriminatory
regulatory alternatives were available to meet this concern: a generally
applicable per-ton additional fee on all hazardous waste disposed of
within Alabama; a per-mile tax on all vehicles transporting hazardous
waste across Alabama roads; or, an evenhanded cap on the total tonnage
of waste landfilled at Emelle which would curtail the volume of wastes
deposited from all sources.' To the extent that this concern related to
environmental conservation and the health and safety of the citizens, the
concern did not vary with the point of origin of the waste.' The Court
concluded that the Additional Fee was an obvious effort to place upon
out-of-state interests the2 burden of slowing the amount of waste flowing
into the Emelle facility. "
The Court distinguished this case from the so-called "quarantine
cases," concluding that because the Alabama law permitted both the
generation and landfilling of hazardous within its borders, and the
importation of still more wastes from other states if the appropriate fee
was paid, the Additional Fee could not be deemed a legitimate quarantine law. 1 In addition, the quarantine laws examined in other cases
did not discriminate against interstate commerce, but simply prevented
traffic in noxious articles irrespective of their origin.'
The Court
simply found no justification in the record for treating hazardous waste
generated outside the State differently from that generated in the State.
In this regard, the Court also found that the case of Maine v. Taylor
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.

Id. at 2015 (citations omitted).
Id.
Id. at 2015-16.
Id. at 2016.
Id. n.10.
Id. at 2016.
Id. (quoting Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 629 (1978)).
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provided no safe harbor for Alabama.' In that case, the State of Maine
had demonstrated on the record that out-of-state baitfish were subject to
parasites not present in indigenous species, and that absent an absolute
ban on the importation of out-of-state baitfish, Maine's aquatic environment could not be protected. In this case, Alabama had not demonstrated
a unique threat posed by out-of-state hazardous waste requiring redress
through the use of the facially discriminatory Additional Fee. '
In the case of Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan
Department of Natural Resources,305 a companion case to the Chemical
Waste Management case, the Court ruled along similar lines. The Fort
Gratiot case involved the Michigan Solid Waste Management Act
(SWMA), which required each county in the State to estimate the amount
of solid waste that would be generated in the next twenty years and to
adopt a plan providing for the disposal of the waste.' The Act also
prohibited the acceptance of waste or ash generated outside the county
unless the county explicitly authorized it in its solid waste management
plan. After complying with the administrative and procedural requirements of the Act, St. Clair County adopted a solid waste management
plan and, pursuant to that plan, issued a permit to the plaintiff to operate
In February, 1989, the plaintiff submitted an application
a landfill.'
to the County for authority to accept up to 1,750 tons per day of
out-of-state waste at its landfill. ' Even though the plaintiff promised
to reserve sufficient capacity to dispose of all solid waste generated in the
county in the next twenty years, the county denied the application since
the management plan did not authorize the acceptance of any out-of-state
waste.09
Noting that solid waste is an article in commerce, the Court
followed its decisions in the Philadelphiaand Chemical Waste Management
cases and concluded that the waste import restrictions of the SWMA
authorized each county to isolate itself from the national economy.3w As
in the Chemical Waste Management case, the Court held it to be the State's
burden to prove that the import restrictions furthered its health and
safety concerns and that those concerns could not be adequately
addressed by some nondiscriminatory alternative.3" Similarly, as with

303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.

Id. at 2017.
Id.
112 S. Ct. 2019 (1992).
Id. at 2021-22.
Id. at 2022.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 2024.
Id. at 2027.
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the Chemical Waste Management case, the Court held that there was "no
valid health and safety reason for limiting the amount of waste that a
landfill operator may accept from outside the State, but not the amount
that the operator may accept from inside the State."312 In addition, the
Court held that the fact that the SWMA allowed some counties to accept
out-of-state waste merely limited the scope of the discrimination, leaving
the discriminatory ban in place. 1 3
Most recently, in the case of Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Dep't
of Envtl. Quality of Oregon, 14 the Court considered circumstances
similar to those of the Chemical Waste Management"' case. However,
unlike the Chemical Waste Management case, the Court was presented with
what it considered sufficient evidence to decide the issue of whether the
State's allegedly "cost-based" surcharge on the disposal of out-of-state
wastes in Oregon passed the applicable Commerce Clause tests. 6
The State of Oregon regulates the disposal of solid wastes within
its borders, and through the Department of Environmental Quality,
implemented a regulatory scheme to manage, reduce and recycle solid
wastes. In 1989, the Oregon legislature imposed an additional fee, or
surcharge, "on every person who disposes of solid waste generated
out-of-state in a disposal site or regional disposal site."317 While
establishing the precise amount of the surcharge was left to the Environmental Quality Commission through its rule-making procedures, the
legislature required that the surcharge "'be based on the costs to the State
of Oregon and its political subdivisions of disposing of solid waste
generated out-of-state which are not otherwise paid for' under other
specified statutes." ' 8 At the conclusion of its rule-making process, the
Environmental Quality Commission set the surcharge on the disposal of
out-of-state wastes at $2.25 per ton.319
At the same time the legislature enacted the surcharge on the
disposal of out-of-state waste, it also imposed a fee of $0.85 on the
disposal of wastes generated in-state.3'
This in-state fee was also
conditionally extended to wastes generated out-of-state, in addition to the
$2.25 per ton surcharge, with the proviso that if the $2.25 surcharge

312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.

Id.
Id. at 2025.
114 S. Ct. 1345 (1994).
112 S. Ct. 2009 (1992).
114 S. Ct. at 1348.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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survived judicial challenge, the $0.85 fee would again be limited to
in-state generated wastes.3 21
Plaintiff Oregon Waste Systems, Inc., owned and operated a solid
waste landfill in Gilliam County, Oregon at which it accepted for final
disposal, wastes generated in Oregon and other states. Plaintiff Columbia
Resource Company held a 20-year contract with Clark County, Washing.ton to transport waste via barge from Clark County to a landfill in
Morrow County, Oregon, for final disposal. Both of these plaintiffs
challenged the administrative rule establishing the out-of-state surcharge
and its enabling statutes under state law and the Commerce Clause.
Eventually, the Oregon State Supreme Court affirmed the validity
of the out-of-state surcharge regime, holding that the resemblance of the
Oregon surcharge to that enacted by the State of Alabama and invalidated in the Chemical Waste Management case was superficial only, and that
the surcharge was not facially discriminatory because it was tied to the
actual costs incurred by the state and local governments.
However,
because Oregon law restricts the scope of judicial review in expedited
proceedings to deciding the facial legality of administrative rules and
their enabling statutes, the state supreme court deemed itself precluded
form deciding the factual question of whether the $2.25 surcharge on the
disposal of wastes generated out-of-state was disproportionate.3
The Court began its analysis by determining whether the facts of
the case indicated discrimination against interstate commerce or provided
circumstances of differential treatment to in-state economic interests."
As with the $72.00 per ton "additional fee" in the Chemical Waste
Management case, the Court deemed it obvious that Oregon's $2.25 per
ton surcharge was facially discriminatory.' The State of Oregon argued
that because the surcharge compensated the State for expenses for which
it would otherwise be uncompensated, a finding that the surcharge was
discriminatory was precluded.' The Court flatly rejected this argument
stating that:
[Tihe purpose of, or justification for a law has no bearing on
whether it is facially discriminatory. (Citation omitted).
Consequently, even if the surcharge merely recoups the costs
of disposing of out-of-state waste in Oregon, the fact remains
that the differential charge favors shippers of Oregon waste
over their counterparts handling waste generated in other

321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.

Id.
114 S. Ct. at 1349.
Id.
Id. at 1347.
Id.
Id. at 1349.
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States. In making that geographic distinction, the surcharge
patently discriminates against interstate commerce.'
The Court continued its analysis indicating, that because the
surcharge was discriminatory on its face, the per se rule of invalidity or
the "strict scrutiny" test of the Hughes"s case was the appropriated
standard to be applied, rather than the more liberal balancing test of the
Pike' case. The Court then and most importantly observed, that the
State failed to claim that the disposal of wastes from another state
imposed higher costs on Oregon and its political subdivisions than the
disposal of wastes generated in-state. ° Similarly, the Court also
observed that Oregon offered no health or safety reason unique to
out-of-state waste for discouraging the flow of such waste into Oregon."' The State of Oregon simply contended that the higher surcharge
on out-of-state waste was a "compensatory tax"' -3 2 necessary to make
shippers of such waste pay their "fair share" of the costs imposed on
Oregon by the disposal of such waste in the state.?33
To establish a valid compensatory tax under the Commerce
Clause, Oregon was required to identify the burden for which it was
attempting to compensate and demonstrate that the surcharge was
roughly approximate to, but did not exceed the in-state fee. The State
was required to demonstrate that the activities on which the interstate
surcharge and intrastate fee were levied, were substantially equivalent;
that the activities were "sufficiently similar in substance to serve as
mutually exclusive proxies for each other."' The Court held that the
surcharge failed these tests. First, Oregon failed to identify a specific tax
327. Id. at 1350.
328. Id. at 1351. See also supra notes 221-31 and accompanying text.
329. Id. at 1347. See also supra notes 195-202 and accompanying text.
330. Id, at 1348. In a footnote, the Court observed that the Oregon Environmental
Commission fixed the $2.25 per ton cost without reference to the waste's origin and that a
consultant hired by the State recognized that the disposal costs for wastes generated in-state
and out-of-state were the same. Id. at 1351 n.5.
331. Id. at 1351. In making this observation, the Court distinguished the case from the
case of Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986), in which the Court upheld Maine's ban on the
importation of out-of-state baitfish because such baitfish were susceptible to parasites foreign to Maine baitfish. See supra notes 232-52 and accompanying text.
332. 114 S. Ct. at 1351. According to the Court, the concept of a compensatory tax is a
"specific way of justifying a facially discriminatory tax as achieving a legitimate local
purpose that cannot be achieved through nondiscriminatory means." Id. at 1352.
333. Id. at 1359. The Court noted that one of the central purposes of the Commerce Clause
is to prevent States from exacting more than a "just"share from interstate commerce, citing
Dep't of Revenue of Washington v. Ass'n of Washington Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734,748
(1978).
334. Id. at 1348 (citations omitted).
335. Id. at 1352.
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imposed on in-state shippers of waste equal to or exceeding that imposed
on interstate shippers, a fact fatal to the State's claim.' Secondly, the
State failed to demonstrate that the in-state and out-of-state taxable events
were substantially equivalent events. "Indeed, the very fact that in-state
shippers of out-of-state waste, such as Oregon Waste, are charged the
out-of-state surcharge even though they pay Oregon income taxes refutes
that the respective taxable events are substantially
respondents''' argument
7
equivalent.
Oregon's final argument was that the imposition of the surcharge
and fee allowed the State to spread the costs of waste disposal to the
appropriate parties. Specifically, the State contended that since the
general citizenry of Oregon benefited from the proper disposal of wastes,
it had an interest in spreading the costs of in-state disposal to all
Oregonians through a higher general tax burden. At the same time,
Oregon contended that the citizens of the state should not be required to
bear the costs of disposing of out-of-state waste. According to the Court,
this "cost spreading" required those who would dispose of out-of-state
waste in Oregon to bear the full costs of in-state disposal, while
permitting those dealing with Oregon waste to bear less than the full
cost.- This constituted economic protectionism forbidden by the
Commerce Clause. Interestingly, the State argued that if protectionism
was involved it was "resource protectionism," rather than economic
protectionism.' In a similarly interesting response, the Court responded: "Even assuming that landfill space is a 'natural resource,' a State may
not accord its own inhabitants a preferred right of access over consumers
in States to natural resources located within its borders."'

336. Id. at 1351. Apparently, the only analogous charge to the out-of-state surcharge was
demonstrated to be the $0.85 per ton fee. Oregon claimed that, despite the fact that it did

not levy a tax of at least $2.25 per ton on the disposal of wastes generated in-state, the
in-state disposal industry nevertheless paid its fair share though general taxation. However,

the State was unable to or did not substantiate this claim as an identifiable burden on
intrastate commerce or demonstrate that if true, the taxes were imposed on substantially

equivalent events.
Interestingly, the Court took the opportunity presented by this discussion to
comment on the case law relied upon by the Oregon Supreme Court in support of its
conclusion that the surcharge was a valid compensatory tax. The Court noted that the legal
standards applied by the Oregon Supreme Court related to "user fees," not compensatory

fees; user fees applying "only to charges imposed by the State for the use of state-owned or
state-provided transportation or other facilities and services." As in the Chemical Waste
Management case, the landfills in this case were privately-owned. See id. at 1352 n.6.

337. Id. at 1353.
338. Id. at 1354.
339. Id.
340. Id. (citing Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 627 (1978)).
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Finally, the Court distinguished the Oregon surcharge from the
permitting process upheld by the Court in Sporhase v. Nebraska." In
the Sporhase case, the Court upheld a Nebraska law that required a permit
for transportation of groundwater across the state line.' Among other
things, the State of Nebraska claimed that its regulation of groundwater
was appropriate since, water was a scarce resource and essential to
human survival.'
With this observation in mind, the Court simply
noted that Sporhase provided "no support for respondents' position that
States may erect a financial barrier to the flow of waste from other States
into Oregon landfills."" The Court continued: "However serious the
shortage in landfill space may be,... No State may attempt to isolate
itself from a problem common to the several States by raising barriers to
the free flow of interstate trade."3* The Court concluded its analysis of
the case by holding that, "[b]ecause respondents have offered no
legitimate reason to subject waste generated in other States to a discriminatory surcharge approximately three times as high as that imposed on
waste generated in Oregon, 3the surcharge is facially invalid under the
negative Commerce Clause." 0
While the Court's treatment of the Oregon case is consistent with
the precedent of earlier landfill or waste transportation cases, Philadelphia
v. New Jersey, Fort Gratiot, and Chemical Waste Management, the case did
provide a convenient forum in which to discuss in more detail the
parameters of the equitable or proportionate taxation of articles in
interstate commerce. Also, although the Court's analysis of the case
offered no surprises, it is interesting to note that the Court appeared to
leave open the issue of whether landfill space is a natural resource.'
It is also interesting that the Court gave so little shrift to distinguishing
the Sporhase case.' Hopefully, the next landfill or waste transportation

341. 458 US. 941 (1982). See supra notes 138-55 and accompanying text.
342. Id. However, such a permit could be granted only if the state into which the water
was being transported, similarly allowed groundwater to be transported out-of-state. The
Court invalidated the reciprocity requirement of the Nebraska permitting process, while
upholding the State's authority to regulate the interstate transportation of groundwater.
343. 458 U.S. 941, 952 (1982).
344. 114 S. Ct. at 1354.
345. Id. (citing Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 112 S.Ct. 2009 (1992)).
346. Id. at 1355.
is true that
347. See supra note 340 and accompanying text. The New Jersey Court noted: "It
in our previous cases the scarce natural resource was itself the article in commerce, whereas
here the scarce resource and the article of commerce are distinct. But that difference is
without consequence." 437 U.S. at 628.
348. The Sporhase opinion offers a number of distinguishing points, not the least of which
are: 1) since the State of Nebraska imposed severe withdrawal and use restrictions of
groundwater on its own citizens, an exemption for interstate transfers would be inconsistent
with the ideal of evenhanded regulation; and 2) because of the Court's equitable
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case will reflect adherence to the Court's suggestion in Chemical Waste
Management, that the States' power to regulate more closely the transportation and disposal of all waste within their borders can be accomplished
through mechanisms less discriminatory than the imposition of taxes
based on the origin of the waste. 9
VIII. Analysis
There are many observations to be made and many principles to
be derived from the previous discussion of these Commerce Clause-natural resource cases. These cases may be divided into several categories: 1)
cases in which the states allow the exportation of resources, but impose
a system of taxes upon the resource, i.e., severance taxes, use taxes or
generation taxes; 2) cases which impose a flat prohibition on the flow of
resources between the States; 3) cases which, while allowing the
exportation of a resource, regulate the exportation through a system of
permits; 4) cases in which the state itself owns and markets the resource
(this may be viewed as a subset of category three); and 5) cases in which
a state seeks an apportioned share of a transitory resource which, by its
nature, is not confined within as state's borders.
The cases in the first category have been governed by the
In order for a tax to be
four-pronged Complete Auto Transit test.'
declared valid, this four-part test requires that the tax: 1) have a
substantial nexus with the State; 2) be fairly apportioned; 3) not discriminate against interstate commerce; and 4) be fairly related to the services
provided by the state." In general, any state imposing a tax on the
severance or use of natural resources will easily meet the first prong of
the test since the resource will either be used, processed, or severed from
the land within the state imposing the tax.5 2 In this manner, the
resource activity will have a substantial nexus with the taxing state.
Similarly, the second prong of the test is generally easy to meet. To avoid
any argument that a tax is, on its face invalid under the Commerce
Clause, states will apportion the tax fairly or "evenhandedly" and avoid
any claim of multiple or discriminatory taxation.'
apportionment decrees in earlier water cases, there appears to be a legal expectation that,
under certain circumstances, a state may restrict the use of water within its borders. See
Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 US. 941, 955-56 (1982).
349. See Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 112 S. Ct. 2009, 2015-16 (1992).
350. See Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 754 (1981); Commonwealth Edison Co. v.
Montana, 453 U.S. 609, reh'g denied, 453 U.S. 927 (1980).
351. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
352. See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 617, rehg denied, 453 US.
927 (1980).
353. Id.
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Most of the cases in this category, however, will be decided
according to the scrutiny required by the third prong of the test. While
the tax may be equally imposed upon all producers and consumers of the
resource, the practical effects of the tax upon one group may be greater
than the effects upon another group. In such a case, the state's entire tax
scheme will be reviewed to determine the effects and interplay of tax
credits and other provisions with the resource tax.?4 Where the tax
scheme imposes an unreasonably heavy burden on out-of-state use or
in-state producers shipping the resource out-of-state, the tax will be
declared invalid under the Commerce Clause as in Maryland v. LouisiWhere the tax burden does not unreasonably discriminate
ana.3
between in-state and out-of-state users and producers, it will have passed
the third prong of the test. However, with respect to this third prong, an
additional rule must be remembered: any tax which discriminates by
providing a direct commercial advantage to local businesses will be
declared invalid.'
Like the third prong of the test, the fourth prong has also
received more analytical attention than the first two prongs. Whether a
tax passes muster under this prong depends in a large part on the type
and purpose of the tax. "User" taxes or fees are usually designed to be
compensatory in nature. This means that they are generally meant to
compensate the taxing state for the use of state-owned or state-provided
transportation, facilities, land, or services. The analysis of such compensatory taxes requires the identification of the burden for which the state is
attempting to be compensated, a conclusion that the tax was designed to
meet that burden and that the out-of-state tax is substantially equivalent
to any analogous in-state tax. Even then, a compensatory tax may not
unreasonably discriminate between local and interstate commerce.m
A tax or fee designed to raise general revenues is treated
differently from user fees under the fourth prong of the test. While a user
fee or tax is compensatory in nature, a general revenue tax need not be
compensatory. Therefore, an analysis of the tax need not identify a
burden and there need be no specific burden which a general revenue tax
is designed to meet in order to be held constitutionally valid. Also,
unlike a user fee, there is no requirement that the amount of general
revenue taxes collected from a particular activity be reasonably related to

354. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 US. 725, 756 (1981).
355. 451 US. 725, 760 (1981).
356. Id. at 754.
357. Id. at 758-59. See also Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Oregon Department of
Environmental Quality, 114 S.Ct.1345, 1351-53 (1994), wherein the Court discusses and
distinguishes between legal standards to be applie to "user fees" and "compensatory fees".
358. Id. at 759.
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the value of services provided by the state that allow the activity to
occur. However, as with a user fee, a general revenue tax may not
unreasonably discriminate against out-of-state producers or consumers.
In essence, the fourth prong of the test is closely related to the first
prong; a resource tax must have a substantial nexus with the state and
must be reasonably related to the extent of the contact or activity of the
taxpayer.'
Where the tax is in proper proportion to the resource
activity and the taxpayer is shouldering his fair share of support for those
state functions funded by general revenues such as police, fire protection,
and, generally, the advantages of a civilized society, the tax will meet the
fourth prong of the test.' " The amount of the tax will be left to the
state legislature's discretion. As long as the tax in question meets the
requirements of all four prongs of the Complete Auto Transit case, the fact
that most of the tax revenues are received from out-of-state consumers,
or the tax burden is borne primarily by out-of-state consumers provides
no basis for a decision that the tax is unconstitutional.
Cases in the second category involving laws mandating a flat
prohibition on the exportation or importation of natural resources or an
economic preference for the citizens of a particular state, almost
unanimously condemn such laws. While the reasons for such prohibitions
are noble, they usually seek to preserve and conserve the water, natural
gas, wildlife, and open space for their citizens, they fly in the face of the
general philosophy which gave birth to the Commerce Clause: the
wealth of one State is the wealth of all States.' Economic isolation and
protectionism on the part of a state legislature has never been condoned.
This protectionism is viewed as being so repugnant to the principles
which formed the basis of the Commerce Clause that it is recognized as
being per se invalid.' The exceptions to the long list of cases review3
ing such state laws are embodied in the case of Maine v. Taylor.
Such prohibitions must not needlessly obstruct interstate trade or attempt
to place the state in a position of economic isolation. At the same time,
such prohibitions must serve a legitimate local purpose which cannot be
served as well by available nondiscriminatory means.
359. See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 622, reh'g denied, 453 U.S.
927 (1980).
360. Id. at 625-26.
361. Id. at 626-27.
362. Id. at 627.
363. See West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911); Pennsylvania v. West
Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923); City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978);
National Solid Wastes Mgmt. Assn v. Alabama Dep't of Envtl. Mgmt., 910 F.2d 713 (11th
Cir. 1990).
364. See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978).
365. 477 U.S. 131 (1986).
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Cases in the third category, involving a statute or administrative
regulation requiring that a permit be obtained before the resource leaves
the state, are judged by a slightly different standard. The general rule in
these "regulatory" cases requires that the statute or regulation regulate
commerce evenhandedly, and then only to effectuate a legitimate local
public interest. If the effects on interstate commerce are only incidental,
the statute or regulation will be upheld unless the burden is excessive in
relation to the putative local benefits.' Where the effects of a statute
or regulation are more than incidental, it may be declared invalid under
the per se rule.' As part of the investigation of the incidental effects
of a statute, the burden on foreign commerce will be considered. A state
burden on foreign commerce is subjected to more rigorous scrutiny since
regulating commerce with foreign nations is the exclusive providence of
the federal government.'
The rule of evenhanded regulation requires that the regulation
demonstrate a close relationship between the local public interest and the
obligations imposed by the regulation.' 9 With this principle in mind,
state statutes which require reciprocal treatment by neighboring states
before commerce in a particular resource will be allowed, appear to be
extremely vulnerable to constitutional attack.37 The rule of evenhanded
regulation also requires that a statute or regulation which is discriminatory on its face undergo the strictest scrutiny.37
In contrast to the present evenhanded application rule, the early
regulatory cases were often decided on the basis of the public ownership
doctrine. This doctrine allowed a state to regulate commerce in a
particular resource on the basis that it "owned" the resource for the
benefit of the public. As stated earlier, this doctrine, as embodied in the
Geer" decision has now been expressly overruled.373
Some Commerce Clause cases, those in the fourth category,
recognize an exception to the usual requirements imposed by the Clause
upon state statutes and regulation. This exception, known as the state
"market-participant" doctrine,374 applies where a state acts not as a

366. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970); Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S.
941, 954 (1982).
367. See South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 100 (1984).
368. See id. at 100.
369. See Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. at 954; Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322,337-38
(1979); Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. at 151.
370. See Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. at 957-58.
371. See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. at 337; Maine v. Taylor, 441 U.S. at 138.
372. Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S.519 (1896).
373. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. at 326-29.
374. See South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. at 93; Hughes v.
Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 810 (1976); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 436-37
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regulator or overseer of commerce, but as the owner, purchaser, or seller
of goods or services in the marketplace. Within this exception, the
Commerce Clause will allow the state to favor its own citizens over
citizens from other states' 7h and operate freely in the marketplace. 76
However, a state market-participant may not impose its will in all aspects
of the given market and expect judicial protection from the traditional
Commerce Clause analysis. The market-participant exception allows a
state to impose burdens on commerce only as they may relate to
transactions to which it is a direct participant. State regulations imposed
on "downstream" markets, or markets beyond the immediate transaction,
are reviewed under the traditional "evenhanded" Commerce Clause
analysis. For this reason, judicial scrutiny of a market-participant
contention will require that the market in which the state is involved be
narrowly defined.
A State may also impose constitutionally valid burdens on
interstate commerce where Congress has expressed its intent to allow
Congress may redefine its power to regulate
such regulation.3'
commerce by permitting States to regulate commerce in a manner that
would otherwise be invalid under traditional analyses.' To prevail on
this legal theory, a demonstration by State that Congress "expressly
stated" its intent and policy to allow the state to regulate commerce is
required.31 In other words, the congressional intent to allow State
regulation of interstate commerce must be "inmistakably clear." This
intent is unmistakably clear when it is expressly stated in the body of a
federal statute." 1 This congressional intent to allow a state to regulate
interstate commerce in an otherwise impermissible manner is not
sufficiently clear where the only evidence of the intent is that the state's
policy is consistent with federal policy.'
The final category of cases allows transitory natural resources to
While this doctrine has a
be equitably apportioned between States.'

(1980).

375. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. at 810.
376. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. at 437.
377. See New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 343 (1982); Sporhase
v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. at 960; South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S.
at 90-91.
378. See South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. at 87-88.
379. See New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 US. at 343; South-Central

Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. at 90-91; Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S.
at 960; see also supra notes 154-55 and accompanying text.
380. South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. at 91.
381. See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981).
382. See South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. at 91.

383. See Idaho v. Oregon, 462 U.S. 1017 (1983).
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long history of applicability to surface water resources running through
several states, it has been applied most recently to anadromous fish
migrating across state boundaries.' The doctrine of equitable apportionment has its roots in the Commerce Clause and in the principle that
a state may not preserve solely for its own inhabitants, the natural
resources within its borders.' The Supreme Court has held that this
doctrine imposes a duty upon States to take reasonable steps to conserve
and even augment the subject resources within their borders for the
Given this statement, one wonders whether
benefit of other States.'
doctrine may be applied to resources other
apportionment
the equitable
than surface water or wildlife resources. In any event, the doctrine, to this
point, has been applied only to transitoryresources, resources which flow
or travel of their own accord across state boundaries.
Most Commerce Clause cases address the dormant or negative
aspect of the Clause. With few exceptions, the Supreme Court has
recognized that Congress need not have legislated in a particular areas
in order for a state law or regulation burdening interstate commerce to
be declared unconstitutional. Unlike the Supremacy Clause," the
Commerce Clause is an express delegation of power to Congress to
regulate matters of interstate commerce. This power cannot be removed
from Congress by its inaction in a particular subject area and is an
implicit limitation on the States' ability to act on matters of interstate
commerce. Of course, where Congress has acted in a particular area of
interstate commerce similar legislation by a state may be susceptible not
only to Commerce Clause invalidity, but also to invalidity under the
Supremacy Clause.
In general, the constitutionality of a law or regulation under the
Commerce Clause will be evaluated by the application of a balancing test
and the rule of reason. This means that state laws and regulations may
burden interstate commerce and afford disparate treatment to out-of-state
uses of natural resources so long as the burden and treatment are
reasonable and reasonably related to the objective sought to be achieved
by the state. The broad embodiment of these concepts of reasonableness
is the Pike case, which has been cited by the Court in almost every
opinion since its writing.' However, such concepts are not applicable
to laws or regulations which are discriminatory on their face. Such
provisions are judged by the stricter standard of the Hughes case. Under
this "strict scrutiny" standard, a facially discriminatory law or regulation

384.
385.
386.
387.
388.

Id. at 1024.
Id. at 1025.
Id.
U.S. CONST. art. IV,cl. 2.
See Trelease, supra note 139, at 344 (citing Hellerstein, supra note 137, at 63-65.).
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is invalid unless it serves a legitimate local purpose which cannot be
served as well by available non-discriminatory means.
IX. Conclusion
Since the 1973-74 Arab oil embargo, Americans have perceived
a need to become energy self-sufficient. This desire for self-sufficiency has
included not just energy-producing resources, but also other strategic
minerals of which the United States has few or no proven reserves. As a
result, increased efforts in natural resources exploration have yielded
discoveries of new and large fields of coal, oil, and natural gas. These
discoveries have been made in many of the western and southwestern
states and Alaska, which have generally lacked the population, wealth,
and infrastructure of the eastern states. These resource-rich states have
attempted to capitalize on their newly-found wealth by levying taxes or
fees on the severance or use of the resources, or by otherwise regulating
the transportation of these resources beyond the states' borders. Often
these taxes, fees, or regulations have been held to be invalid under the
Commerce Clause as interfering with Congress' exclusive power to
regulate interstate and foreign commerce. However, some carefully
drafted state severance or use taxes have passed Commerce Clause
muster, and have secured for the resource-rich states financial and
aesthetic benefits not shared by or available to other states.
But the emphasis on the quality of life and preserving the
environment dictates that resource development cannot occur at any cost.
Society will no longer tolerate the social and environmental degradation
that resulted from the early natural resource exploitation that dirtied the
air and water in many parts of the eastern United States and West Coast.
Today, the resource-rich states attempt to require that resource development be planned to minimize adverse impacts. This planning and impact
mitigation requires the expenditure of vast sums of money which would
otherwise be "clear profit" from the development of the natural resources.
These expenditures cannot assure the complete survival of a pristine
environment during and after the resource development process; some
environmental changes will occur irrespective of the preventative
measures taken. However, the resource-rich states must be allowed to
profit from their resources, to develop economically, preserve aesthetic
values and protect their citizens from environmental catastrophe; such is
the nature of the free market. Inevitable, this development will result in
the production of waste, much of which is hazardous to human health
and the environment. Some states have and will bear more of the burden
of the storage and disposition of these wastes by virtue of their geology
or low population density. However, avenues are available to lessen that
burden on those few states by apportioning the costs among the waste
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generators. As the Court has stated, the historically unifying mandate of
the Commerce Clause dictates that the wealth of one state be considered
the wealth of all states. So must the burden of one state be considered the
burden of all states.

